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TEMPORAL EQUAL PROTECTION* 
BY DAVID A. SUPER** 
In law as in life, we make both cross-sectional comparisons between analogous 
things at the same time and temporal comparisons involving the same thing at 
different times. Equal protection analysis, however, has been entirely cross-
sectional. Applying equal protection temporally would address the all-too-
common situation where the dominant group benefits from laws and then pulls 
up the ladder behind it before minorities can follow. 
Courts have struggled when confronted with temporal denials of equal 
protection. State and local governments terminated public services during the 
“massive resistance” period. Similarly, after Obergefell, some jurisdictions 
stopped issuing marriage licenses. Subtler problems have arisen as schools and 
other public programs have steadily lost funding after being opened to people of 
color and as states tighten voter identification rules when people of color vote in 
larger numbers. Debates on the intent required for an equal protection claim 
obscure questions about how to measure inequality. 
Temporal equal protection would add to a wide range of constitutional and 
quasi-constitutional doctrines that inhibit change. These stasis-reinforcing 
doctrines provide valuable guidance on how temporal equal protection could 
function. Because the remedy of blocking, rather than forcing, change is less 
intrusive on the political branches, courts have applied searching scrutiny more 
freely under exacting stasis-reinforcing doctrines than when forcing change 
under cross-sectional equal protection. They have recognized economic-based 
oppression, have not demanded overwhelming evidence of intent, and have 
considered context more seriously. 
Temporal equal protection alone will not remedy persistent inequality, but it can 
address some problems that current doctrine cannot. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Almost everyone, from serious social scientists to ordinary people going 
about their daily affairs, assesses the world through two distinct kinds of 
comparison. We compare different things that exist at the same time for their 
similarities and differences—cross-sectional analysis in the language of 
statisticians. And we compare the same thing over time looking for consistency 
and change—what statisticians call time-series analysis. Each analysis provides 
important insights, springing in part from its distinctive baseline for the 
comparison. It is unfair to criticize an airline for being late more often this 
month than last because the weather may have been worse, but we may gain 
insight from comparing one airline’s on-time performance to the industry 
average. Similarly, comparing my soccer game to Lionel Messi’s is unfair 
because I could never be that good, but you may gain insight from assessing 
how much better or worse I am doing relative to the last time I played. 
Strikingly, however, contemporary equal protection analysis is essentially 
all cross-sectional. If, at any given time, a legal regime imposes different rules 
on whites and on people of color without sufficient justification, the courts 
deem that regime to have violated its duties of equal protection. If, however, a 
legal regime changes its rules when, over time, the characteristics of the people 
to whom those rules apply change, we rarely attempt serious equal protection 
analysis. If the change does not infringe upon a limited set of protected 
98 N.C. L. REV. 59 (2019) 
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expectations, and if it was procedurally acceptable, it gets a pass 
constitutionally. 
A simple example illustrates the point. Few would argue that any 
constitutional principle prevents state parks from closing either at noon or at 
8:00 p.m. Furthermore, nothing prohibits the delegation of authority to set the 
closing time to the superintendent of the park. What if, however, the 
superintendent changes the closing time frequently, adopting the 8:00 p.m. 
closing when a large group is scheduled to arrive from a predominately white 
community and the noon closing when a tour group from a largely African 
American neighborhood is expected? Indeed, what if the superintendent 
changed the park’s closing time for each new carload of prospective visitors, 
elongating it when whites are approaching and shortening it when a family of 
color drives up? What if the superintendent adopts longer hours for the days of 
the week, or seasons, when visitors tend to be white and shorter hours during 
the periods when more of the park’s visitors are people of color? At no point are 
whites treated better than people of color wishing to use the park at the same 
moment, yet the effect of these strategic shifts in policy over time is to give 
whites far more access to the park than people of color. One could argue that 
the superintendent is applying a covert policy of shortening hours for African 
Americans and elongating them for whites, but current doctrine imposes 
difficult standards of proof for such a claim, especially if the superintendent 
only acts most of the time that the racial composition of park visitors shifts. 
Temporal reductions also are troubling when they involve fundamental 
rights. No obvious, transcendent principle tells us how often governors or state 
legislators ought to be elected. But we instinctively rebel against the notion that 
officials, having won an election, may extend their own terms, depriving their 
opponents the same right to contest and win an election that they enjoyed. 
Similarly, although arguments may be made for broad discovery and liberal 
joinder or for limited discovery and restrictive joinder, it would be troubling if 
my allies changed the procedures that applied when I sued you by the time you 
took me to court. 
Awareness of both kinds of discrimination permeate our culture. We 
demand cross-sectional equality when we say “what’s good for the goose is good 
for the gander,” but we also recognize the importance of temporal equality when 
we say “what goes around, comes around.” 
Many equal protection problems are actually intertemporal problems. 
Senator Jacob Howard said that the proposed Equal Protection Clause would 
prohibit a Black man from being executed for a crime for which a white man 
would not be.1 This surely is true for simultaneous trials. But that disparity in 
treatment would be no better if the law of capital punishment was changed 
 
 1. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866). 
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between the time of the two trials to spare the white man or to condemn the 
African American. Similarly, challenges to the administration—rather than the 
substance—of laws address situations when administrators act differently at 
different times, sometimes harshly enforcing laws to the benefit of favored 
groups but at other times ignoring them to the detriment of those they dislike.2 
Given the Equal Protection Clause’s textual focus on administration of the 
laws,3 the absence of formal shifts in the legal rules between disparate 
applications of those rules should not be grounds for refusing to apply temporal 
equal protection. 
To date, however, the Supreme Court generally has sought to avoid 
considering temporal equal protection claims. For a time after Brown v. Board 
of Education,4 the Court seemed to embrace a theory of equal protection that 
attacked racial aggression or subordination without regard to any comparisons, 
cross-sectional or temporal. But when it decided cases based on comparisons, it 
considered only cross-sectional ones. When confronted with obvious temporal 
abuses during the “massive resistance” period, it either accepted policy changes 
that denied African Americans what whites long had enjoyed5 or insisted on 
reframing the problem as cross-sectional discrimination by finding some current 
favorable treatment for whites that was not being afforded to African 
Americans.6 
The basic principle should be that for a governmental body to apply a more 
favorable legal rule to members of a dominant group and a harsher rule to those 
of a systematically disadvantaged minority is a denial of equal protection. It 
should not matter whether those two groups exist at the same time or at 
different times. Put another way, if we reject the principle of temporal equal 
protection, we accept that the government may deny rights or services to people 
of a disfavored racial or religious group solely because of their race or religion 
so long as it is not simultaneously providing that right or service to members of 
the dominant group. This seems a disturbingly narrow vision of equal 
protection. 
This Article contends that we are unlikely to achieve meaningful equality 
without taking temporal equal protection seriously and that doing so would not 
seriously burden representative democracy. Although the values it upholds are 
 
 2. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886) (describing the unequal application 
of an ordinance against people of Chinese ancestry). 
 3. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? 120 
(1994). 
 4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 5. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 226 (1971) (allowing the city to close public 
swimming pools rather than open them to African Americans). 
 6. See, e.g., Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cty., 377 U.S. 218, 230–31 (1964) (finding 
discrimination in the closing of all public schools because the county was assisting all-white private 
academies). 
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similar to those of cross-sectional equal protection, its function would be similar 
to the many change-inhibiting principles well-established in our constitutional 
law. 
Part I examines the limited influence temporal ideas have already had on 
equal protection thinking. This includes modest substantive applications as well 
as some impact on remedies. 
Part II contends that the limitations we have been told are inevitable in 
equal protection actually are specific to judicial review of line drawing rather 
than inherent in the concept of equal protection itself. As such, when equal 
protection is applied temporally, scrutinizing policy changes rather than 
distinctions within policies, many of those problems attenuate or disappear 
altogether. This part considers how an explicitly temporal equal protection 
doctrine might operate, drawing guidance from other change-inhibiting 
doctrines as well as from cross-sectional equal protection. In particular, it 
contends that the combined effect of temporal equal protection’s narrower 
scope—only changes in law—and its far less intrusive remedies—preserving a 
status quo crafted by democratic institutions—ameliorates the institutional 
concerns the Court has invoked to cabin cross-sectional equal protection. This 
makes viable a more pragmatic, though still highly deferential, mode of 
scrutiny. 
Part III demonstrates that although equal protection law has neglected 
temporal analysis, many other areas of constitutional law have imposed 
analogous change-inhibiting doctrines. In important respects, the challenges of 
inhibiting change differ from those of forcing it, making these aspects of 
constitutional law valuable in understanding temporal equal protection’s 
potential. Several important principles uniting other change-inhibiting 
doctrines offer valuable insight into how temporal equal protection might 
operate. This survey shows us that we already have numerous rules and 
institutional arrangements that entrench the status quo against majoritarian 
change. Applying equal protection principles temporally would not break new 
ground in anti-majoritarianism but rather would add equal opportunity to the 
list of concerns that we sometimes elevate above majoritarian democracy in our 
republic. 
The conclusion offers a few necessarily superficial sketches of claims that 
might be brought under temporal equal protection. Some of these are problems 
that have vexed cross-sectional equal protection; others are social problems that 
previously have been thought outside the ambit of equal protection analysis. 
Not all of these claims would likely prevail, but in each instance the temporal 
perspective helps identify the essential issues. 
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I.  TEMPORAL EQUAL PROTECTION TO DATE 
At present, the Court recognizes only a cross-sectional form of equal 
protection. This dominance is somewhat odd because, in a loose sense, cross-
sectional equal protection reflects civil law sensibilities, which presume that the 
benefit of a statute is extended to others similarly situated. Temporal equal 
protection, by contrast, exemplifies the common law tradition that relies on 
consistent application of rules across time.7 
At one time, however, the Court took some tentative steps down a path 
that could have led it to temporal equal protection. The Court’s subsequent 
narrowing of the scope of equal protection eliminated that possibility. Some of 
the Court’s struggles with crafting remedies for cross-sectional discrimination 
highlight the advantages of a temporal approach. This part surveys the degree 
to which temporal equal protection ideas already have penetrated constitutional 
thinking. 
A. The Prevalence of Temporal Discrimination 
Larry Alexander posits that many purported changes camouflage as 
consistent, discriminatory meta-rules.8 And indeed fair housing, employment, 
and other fields of antidiscrimination law occasionally look to such purported 
temporal changes as evidence that covert cross-sectional discrimination is 
underway: the apartment or job that was supposedly unavailable for an 
applicant of color turns out to be open after all when white applicants arrive. 
No doubt some purported temporal changes are indeed fraudulent attempts to 
conceal cross-sectional discrimination. 
Sometimes, however, the change is real and is applied consistently at a 
given time. When southern governments closed public facilities they had been 
ordered to integrate, those facilities often were truly closed.9 When some 
jurisdictions tried to withdraw government licensure of marriages rather than 
opening themselves to same-sex couples, they genuinely shut down licensing.10 
These are not cases of cross-sectional discrimination. 
Well-timed policy changes become highly attractive means of 
disadvantaging protected classes. Only the naive would expect that bigots will 
meekly abandon their agendas when prevented from engaging in cross-sectional 
discrimination. Changing longstanding rules that are benefiting the groups the 
bigots dislike—temporal discrimination—often will be an appealing alternative 
means of achieving similar ends. More broadly, as government programs, and 
 
 7. See Note, The Legitimacy of Civil Law Reasoning in the Common Law: Justice Harlan’s 
Contribution, 82 YALE L.J. 258, 272–74 (1972) (describing the civil law approach). 
 8. Larry Alexander, Rules, Rights, Options, and Time, 6 LEGAL THEORY 391, 399–401 (2000). 
 9. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 219.  
 10. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.  
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the protection of laws, broadened over the past half-century to include more 
African Americans and other people of color, women, and sexual-identity 
minorities, this country has become increasingly resistant to funding many 
kinds of programs and hostile to protective regulations.11 Some of this is no 
doubt philosophical, but a malign bloc that supports spending and government 
intervention for whites, for men, or for traditional families—but not for 
interventions from which all people benefit—is decisive when big- and small-
government forces are near equipoise.12 Thus, in cities where many white 
students left for suburban or private schools, white legislators and voters have 
cut funding for public schools that now serve predominately students of color—
but all students in those schools suffer the same. Scholars on both the Left13 and 
Right14 have argued that public welfare policy in this country became far more 
restrictive after the “Civil Rights Revolution” opened programs up to African 
Americans.15 
A robust temporal equal protection doctrine would limit the government’s 
ability to withdraw policies that have benefited members of a dominant group 
when those policies are about to benefit members of a vulnerable group. If cross-
sectional equal protection seeks to “protect against substantive outrages by 
requiring that those who would harm others must at the same time harm 
themselves,”16 temporal equal protection guards against such outrages by forcing 
would-be malefactors to harm themselves previous to harming others. Temporal 
equal protection would limit the government’s ability to withdraw certain 
beneficial policies when the population those policies serve changes to include 
more members of unpopular groups. 
B. Temporal Equal Protection and Constitutional Theory 
Temporal equal protection fits well in the broader framework of 
constitutional theory. As Section I.B.1 shows, concern about change—both 
forcing change in corrupt, oppressive regimes and guarding against the sudden 
elimination of important rights—has long been at the core of much of the 
 
 11. See, e.g., Why So Many People Hate Obamacare, CNN (Jan. 6, 2017), https://money.cnn.com/
2017/01/05/news/economy/why-people-hate-obamacare/index.html [https://perma.cc/WAL5-ZTRP].  
 12. See William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 
171, 171–72 (2000) (urging this sort of disaggregation of legislative intent). 
 13. See, e.g., DOROTHY K. NEWMAN ET AL., PROTEST, POLITICS, AND PROSPERITY: BLACK 
AMERICANS AND WHITE INSTITUTIONS, 1940–75, at 264–65 (1978). 
 14. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. MEAD, THE NEW POLITICS OF POVERTY: THE NONWORKING 
POOR IN AMERICA 33 (1992) (finding that African Americans’ enrollment in Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children after racial barriers fell “damag[ed] antipoverty policy”). 
 15. See David A. Super, Protecting Civil Rights in the Shadows, 123 YALE L.J. 2806, 2810–11, 2824, 
2827, 2830 (2014) (comparing the difficulty people of lower income and racial minorities have 
organizing). 
 16. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 170 
(1980) (emphasis added). 
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theoretical underpinning of constitutional law. Moreover, Section I.B.2 shows 
that the central objection to vigorous equal protection scrutiny—the need to 
respect majoritarian decisionmaking—takes on a different, and generally less 
troubling, form in temporal analysis than it does in cross-sectional critiques. 
Finally, Section I.B.3 shows that John Locke’s theory of the role private 
property plays in a liberal democracy, a theory that deeply influenced the 
Founders, by its own terms works only when opportunities remain open to all 
over time. 
1.  The Central Role of Change in Equal Protection Theory 
At least since Footnote 4,17 cross-sectional equal protection has been 
described in terms of political market failure.18 Because some groups form 
discrete and insular minorities against whom many voters will rally and with 
whom few other voters will ally, the usual majoritarian process will not properly 
reflect their views. That same political market failure causes increased support 
for policy changes at times when they are likely to harm discrete and insular 
minorities disproportionately. 
Indeed, much of contemporary constitutional theory is at least implicitly 
about change and hence implicates temporal equal protection. For example, part 
of the justification for judicial enforcement of fundamental rights is to prevent 
regimes that took power democratically from changing the rules so that they 
may not be deposed in the same way. Similarly, much of what gives a 
presidential administration its force is the President’s ability to impose legal 
change much more rapidly than the other branches can respond. Where legal 
change will increasingly face no effective institutional constraints, the danger 
that incumbents act to privilege members of their coalition and deny similar 
opportunities to those coming along later will inevitably rise. Yet on those rare 
occasions where constitutional theorists consider the effect of temporal 
inequality, they have seemed to assume without close analysis that the political 
branches’ right to change rules is far more inviolable than their right to impose 
classifications.19 
2.  Temporal Equal Protection and the Anti-Majoritarian Difficulty 
More broadly, judges and scholars across the ideological spectrum have 
argued for cabining judicial intervention out of respect for the democratic 
 
 17. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that the 
end of the Lochner era did not preclude invocation of equal protection to protect fundamental rights of 
discrete and insular minorities).  
 18. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 16, at 103 (arguing that judicial review is justified primarily to keep 
the machinery of democracy functioning and to prevent majorities from oppressing permanent 
minorities).  
 19. See Alexander, supra note 8, at 391–92. 
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process.20 Yet even the strongest advocates of deliberative democracy concede 
that truly democratic results are impossible as long as a large segment of the 
electorate is impoverished and heavily dependent on the outcome of the 
political process for the basic means of subsistence.21 These people will be 
subject to strong influence by their more affluent compatriots in the process. 
Those dependent on the political process for protection of their vital interests 
experience the political process in a way altogether different from those whose 
core interests have constitutional security: the former must proceed from the 
perspective of self-interest while the latter may choose to pursue still-greater 
personal advantage but also may choose to vote to achieve their ideological 
preferences. Mitt Romney famously captured this dynamic when he 
complained that nearly half of the population’s votes would be dominated by 
their desire to retain government benefits and hence would not be available to 
him even if they ideologically agreed with his message.22 Having some 
protection against devastating withdrawals of subsistence benefits would free 
these voters to select candidates on other criteria as well. 
Professor Derrick Bell persuasively argued that African Americans obtain 
the most positive public policies when their interests align well with those of 
whites.23 Arranging circumstances so that whites and African Americans benefit 
from the same policies at the same time, however, is exceedingly difficult. 
Temporal equal protection expands the application of Professor Bell’s principle 
to many more situations by protecting minorities if they can benefit from 
policies that previously benefitted the dominant group. Indeed, temporal 
analysis can provide real-world insights analogous to a Rawlsian veil of 
ignorance24: members of the dominant group established a rule not considering 
that it might benefit those to whom they are unsympathetic. Preventing 
opportunistic reversal of that rule preserves their insight when they were free 
of corrupting knowledge about whom the rule would serve. 
 
 20. See, e.g., James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 
7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 135–42, 148–49 (1893).  
 21. AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 142–43 
(2004). 
 22. David Corn, Secret Video: Romney Tells Millionaire Donors What He Really Thinks of Obama 
Voters, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 17, 2012), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/09/secret-video-
romney-private-fundraiser/ [https://perma.cc/VF63-HB8P] (published in conjunction with the 
original video). Governor Romney was, in fact, wrong on two counts: the fraction of the electorate 
receiving government transfer payments fell far short of forty-seven percent, and, as the 2016 election 
demonstrated, millions of people who do receive public benefits will occasionally vote for candidates 
threatening to remove those benefits. This, however, is aberrational behavior, and his basic notion that 
current conditions prevent elections from being full debates about what is best for the nation has 
considerable force. 
 23. See Derrick A. Bell Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 93 
HARV. L. REV. 518, 523–25 (1980). 
 24. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 137 (1971). 
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The key reason for limiting any equality-promoting doctrine is respect for 
the political processes.25 Both cross-sectional and temporal equal protection 
limit what legislatures and executive officials may do. The balance between the 
principle of equality and that of democratic self-governance depends on the 
degree to which upholding the former compromises the latter. Cross-sectional 
and temporal equal protection impact the democratic process quite differently, 
with those differences being an important factor in how much each doctrine 
should be permitted to override executive and legislative decisions. 
The crucial factor forcing curtailment on cross-sectional equal protection 
is the need and right of the legislature to enact classifications.26 “There is hardly 
a law on the books that does not affect some people differently from others,”27 
and legislatures cannot function if prevented from making both principled and 
pragmatic judgments about whom should be covered by which rules. 
By contrast, the interests justifying temporal discrimination can be framed 
as essential to the right of the legislature to change its mind or of the electorate 
to change its legislature. This concern is real: if we do not allow legislatures to 
change their policies once adopted, we can no longer say that “elections have 
results” and we may no longer operate “laboratories of democracy” to seek out 
optimal solutions. The Lochner era taught us the perils of constitutionalizing 
any one system of legal rules.28 On the other hand, because successful temporal 
equal protection litigation, unlike many cross-sectional equal protection claims, 
would leave in place policies that the people’s elected representatives designed, 
it is far less of an affront to democracy and hence can reasonably be applied in 
situations where courts would hesitate to honor an analogous cross-sectional 
claim. Indeed, our constitutional law leans heavily in favor of change-inhibiting 
doctrines, as temporal equal protection would be, rather than change-forcing 
ones, as cross-sectional equal protection tends to be. In Federalist No. 62, James 
Madison cautioned that “the mischievous effects of a mutable government” are 
“innumerable” and argued for constitutional measures to guard against the 
 
 25. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245–48 (1976) (describing intrusions on the 
political process likely to result if the Court were to extend cross-sectional equal protection to cases 
where discriminatory animus could not be shown); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1, 40–55 (1973) (describing how extending heightened constitutional scrutiny would undermine 
state democratic processes). 
 26. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 221–28 (1962); ELY, supra note 16, at 30–31; MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 60–61 (1999); see James B. Thayer, supra note 20, at 135–
42, 148–49 (explaining the origins of judicial deference to legislative decisions). But see PERRY, supra 
note 3, at 149–55 (questioning the originalist legitimacy of extending equal protection scrutiny beyond 
rules failing to recognize persons’ humanity). 
 27. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 60 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 28. “The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”. Lochner 
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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hazards of policy changes, even those resulting from majorities of voters 
selecting different representatives.29 
3.  Temporal Equal Protection and Property Theory 
A legal regime in which people of color, or other disfavored groups, 
consistently encounter more difficult barriers than did their forebears in the 
dominant group is deeply problematic. It tends to discredit the notion of an 
opportunity society—the American Dream that hard work and playing by the 
rules get one ahead. It makes our strong preference for prospective-only 
remedies to cross-sectional discrimination highly problematic: if the dominant 
group need only sustain a preferential legal regime long enough to give its 
members an advantage, those disadvantaged by the cross-sectional wrong will 
continue to labor under an undeserved disadvantage absent reparations, 
affirmative action, or other means. Employment discrimination affects workers’ 
abilities to compete for good homes in neighborhoods with good schools.30 With 
education and home equity being the two most important means of inter-
generational transmission of wealth, initial advantages bestowed on one 
segment of society may spawn many decades of inequality if other groups do 
not get a comparable moment in the sun.31 
By contrast, if the act of granting a head start to its own members compels 
the dominant group to afford similar opportunities to those coming after it, the 
payoffs from discrimination will be far less. This principle of justice is 
embedded in the Lockean concept of private property rights that undergirds 
our legal order: mixing one’s labor with the land creates property rights only so 
long as there is enough, and land as good, for those that come later.32  
C. Temporal Equal Protection in Existing Substantive Doctrine 
The equal protection analysis the Lochner court conducted prior to 1937 
was simply too different from the contemporary version to allow beneficial 
comparisons. After entrenching the New Deal’s legitimacy, the Court began to 
revive equal protection law under the new framework set out in Footnote 4 of 
Carolene Products.33 Its initial cases were unclear as to whether they would 
require a mechanical comparison at all or merely scrutinize laws harming 
members of suspect classes. By rejecting the “separate but equal” approach on 
legal rather than factual grounds, the Court extended equal protection to guard 
 
 29. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 303–05 (James Madison) (Terence Ball ed., 2003). 
 30. See Devah Pager & Hana Shepherd, The Sociology of Discrimination: Racial Discrimination in 
Housing, Credit, and Consumer Markets, 34 ANN. REV. SOC. 181, 198–99 (2008). 
 31. See id. 
 32. See Carol M. Rose, ‘Enough, and as Good’ of What?, 81 NW. U. L. Rev. 417, 423 (1987) 
(exploring what is required for property formation to be just under a Lockean framework).  
 33. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
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against legislation hostile to discrete and insular minorities without requiring 
formal comparisons. Loving v. Virginia34 similarly recognized that rules that 
nominally affected people of all races equally could have a degrading effect on 
people of color.35 Had this trend in the Court’s equal protection doctrine 
continued, the need for temporal equal protection would have been far less.36 
When the Court later moved to narrow its equal protection jurisprudence, 
however, it more rigidly required cross-sectional comparisons. Indeed, cross-
sectional comparisons became so central to the Court’s doctrine that it began to 
scrutinize the precision of proffered analogies.37 As Section I.C.1 shows, equal 
protection doctrine did recognize the importance of temporal change. Whatever 
promise those moves might have had, however, was lost in cases suggesting that 
temporal claims must be reframed in cross-sectional terms or lose completely. 
Section I.C.4 finds indications that state constitutional law may be more readily 
adapted to consider temporal equal protection claims. 
1.  Partial Acceptance of Temporal Analysis in Equal Protection Doctrine 
Temporal equal protection concepts have appeared in several areas of 
constitutional doctrine, but the Court has fallen far short of explicitly 
recognizing the principle. The Court has acknowledged the importance of 
temporal equality by ruling that newly admitted states enjoy the same rights as 
the original thirteen.38 Its doctrine disallowing facially neutral rules if enacted 
with a discriminatory purpose39 places the emphasis on the act of legislating, 
rather than the legislation itself, and thus has the effect of disallowing a 
particular, albeit narrow, class of regressive changes.40 
In upholding part of the Voting Rights Act against a cross-sectional equal 
protection challenge to its failure to eradicate all comparable harms, the Court 
made an explicitly temporal argument, granting Congress far greater latitude 
for legislation that enhances access to fundamental rights, however imperfectly, 
 
 34. 38 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 35. Id. at 11. 
 36. Throughout this period, the Court continued to analyze some cases involving fundamental 
rights on the basis of cross-sectional comparisons, see, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 232–37 (1962) 
(holding that congressional districts with large population disparities are unconstitutional), although it 
addressed many fundamental rights claims without invoking equal protection, see, e.g., Boddie v. 
Connecticut, 402 U.S. 371, 382–83 (1971). 
 37. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1973) (noting that 
low-income students do not always live in school districts with low tax bases); Dandridge v. Williams, 
397 U.S. 471 (1970) (asserting that complete denial of aid to one child could be characterized as a partial 
reduction to all children in a family). 
 38. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 573 (1911). 
 39. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–41 (1976). 
 40. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229 (1985) (finding discriminatory intent in 
post-Reconstruction changes to the Alabama Constitution). 
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relative to legislation that restricts rights.41 More recently, however, the Court 
has backed away from that idea.42 The Court also has relied on temporal 
comparisons to strike down attempts to repeal or override civil rights 
protections, even ones that go beyond what it holds the Constitution to 
require.43 In these situations, the end state—no civil rights protections beyond 
those in federal law—is not constitutionally offensive,44 but the act of removing 
heightened protections is. 
Moreover, in two important respects, temporal analysis permeates 
contemporary cross-sectional equal protection analysis. First, its requirement 
that those disproportionately harmed prove discriminatory intent in 
challenging a facially neutral rule focuses attention on the act of changing policy 
rather than on comparisons of how that policy treats members of different 
groups. If the act of enacting facially neutral policy was performed improperly, 
it is invalid and may open the door to reinstating prior policy. Second, the state 
action requirement focuses on specific interventions to change what is otherwise 
occurring in society. When the state merely sits back and allows powerful 
private entities to prey on others, the Court finds no state action.45 It is only 
the affirmative act of exercising state power that implicates equal protection 
doctrine.46 Here again, it is the act that is scrutinized, not the resulting state of 
the world; the effect is making the status quo easier to maintain than to change. 
2.  Missed Opportunities to Embrace Temporal Equal Protection 
When confronted directly with denials of temporal equal protection, to 
date the Court has looked away. At times it has found ways to stretch the facts 
to make out a fuzzy cross-sectional equal protection claim, but on other 
occasions it has upheld withdrawals of public policies when a disfavored group 
was set to benefit from them. 
In Griffin v. School Board of Prince Edward County,47 a white-dominated 
government closed its public schools rather than integrate them in compliance 
with Brown v. Board of Education. The Court recognized that allowing the 
county to close its public schools would devastate the desegregation enterprise 
 
 41. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966). 
 42. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 527–28 (1997) (arguing that an interpretation of 
Katzenbach expanding Congress’s power to interpret the Constitution is misguided). 
 43. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (overturning ballot initiative preventing 
efforts against anti-LGBTQ discrimination); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 381 (1967) 
(overturning ballot initiative overriding California’s fair housing law). 
 44. Romer, 517 U.S. at 628–31; Reitman, 387 U.S. at 374–75. 
 45. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972) (finding no state action in 
the granting of a liquor license to a discriminatory social club). 
 46. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (finding the Equal 
Protection Clause applicable to a restaurant operating in a state facility with which government was 
working closely). 
 47. 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
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but struggled with how to characterize the violation. It acknowledged that cross-
sectional inequities between counties—all other Virginia counties maintained 
public schools—did not merit heightened scrutiny under its doctrine.48 It 
recognized that the problem was the closure of the public schools49 but could 
not find a cross-sectional comparison that would allow it to invoke equal 
protection. Ultimately, because both the state and the county provided 
extensive aid to private, all-white schools operating in place of the closed public 
schools, the Court essentially treated the closures as a scam violating its cross-
sectional equal protection decision in Brown.50 Accordingly, it ordered the 
county to reopen its public schools on a desegregated basis.51 The Court might 
have had a more difficult time had the case come before it during the first year 
of the public schools’ closure, when the private replacement schools relied on 
private funding.52 That would have forced it to address directly the termination 
of public services because of a change—brought about by Brown—in who would 
benefit from those services. Cross-sectional equal protection would not have an 
obvious response to that action, but temporal equal protection clearly would. 
This unwillingness to analyze discrimination temporally caused the Court 
greater difficulties when confronted two years later with a Georgia park that a 
municipality held under a trust document mandating racial discrimination.53 
The city resigned as trustee, seeking to discontinue the park’s public status and 
allow African Americans to continue to be excluded.54 At first, a bare majority 
held that the city’s ongoing involvement in park maintenance continued to 
implicate the city in racial exclusion.55 The Court acknowledged that years of 
municipal involvement had given the park “momentum”56 but failed to examine 
whether the city had sufficiently contributed to that momentum to make its 
termination unlawful. Here, as in Griffin, it found racial animus and essentially 
ruled on that basis alone, essentially admitting that it could not make out a 
coherent cross-sectional comparison.57 
A Georgia court responded by declaring that the trust had failed and that 
the park land should revert to the residual heirs of the settlor, refusing to reform 
the trust through cy pres to remove the racial condition.58 Although the Georgia 
 
 48. Griffin, 377 U.S. at 230–31. 
 49. Id. at 231. 
 50. Id. at 232. 
 51. Id. at 233. 
 52. Id. at 223. 
 53. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 297 (1966). 
 54. Id. at 298. 
 55. Id. at 301. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See id. at 301–02. 
 58. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 438–39 (1970) (deciding whether the Georgia Supreme Court 
violated equal protection and due process when it failed to order integration of the park on remand 
after Newton). 
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court seemed to be disregarding both the terms of the will and basic Georgia 
trusts and estates law,59 the more technical nature of these questions obscured 
the racial animus. 
Now, the sole question was the elimination of a park once its beneficiaries 
were to include African Americans. The Court declared itself “disheartened”60 
but could find no objection within cross-sectional equal protection law.61 In his 
dissent, Justice Brennan focused on the act of closing a longstanding public park 
and, invoking Griffin, argued that that act itself should be scrutinized.62 
The following year, the Court had to confront the viability of temporal 
comparisons in equal protection analysis. When ordered to desegregate five 
municipal parks and swimming pools, Jackson, Mississippi, instead chose to 
close them. The Fifth Circuit upheld this action by a single vote, and the 
Supreme Court did the same.63 The Court began by noting the absence of any 
persuasive cross-sectional comparison as people of all races currently lacked 
access to the parks.64 It then found that the city’s claimed fiscal and public safety 
reasons for closing the pools made racial animus less apparent and, in any event, 
irrelevant where no valid cross-sectional comparison showed different rules 
simultaneously being applied to people of different races.65 Choosing to read 
Griffin narrowly as a cross-sectional comparison case—with the state covertly 
providing education to white students but not African American ones—the 
Court rejected any temporal reach for the Equal Protection Clause.66 
Similar issues can arise whenever changes in demographics, economics, or 
law broaden the scope of who might benefit from particular rules or public 
programs. For example, when the Court held that excluding same-sex couples 
from the right to marry was unconstitutional,67 some states sought to 
discontinue issuing marriage licenses at all. From a cross-sectional perspective, 
this was no different from the swimming pools closed in Palmer v. Thompson68: 
once those policies were adopted, both gay and straight couples wishing to 
obtain marriage licenses were treated the same. Indeed, the Alabama district 
court that ordered state probate judges to stop distinguishing between same- 
and opposite-sex couples in issuing marriage licenses explicitly suggested that 
issuing none at all might be an acceptable solution.69 In the litigation concerning 
 
 59. Id. at 448–50 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 60. Id. at 443 (majority opinion). 
 61. Id. at 439. 
 62. Id. at 453 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 63. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 219 (1971). 
 64. Id. at 220. 
 65. Id. at 225. 
 66. Id. at 221–23. 
 67. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015). 
 68. 403 U.S. 217 (1971). 
 69. Strawser v. Strange, 105 F. Supp. 3d 1323, 1329 n.3 (S.D. Ala. 2015). 
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a Kentucky county clerk’s refusal to issue any marriage licenses, plaintiffs and 
the amici focused entirely on the extent of the burden on the fundamental right 
to marry rather than the inequity of withdrawing a public service that had been 
available when only heterosexual couples could use it.70 Temporal analysis 
would have made that litigation much simpler. 
3.  Temporal Equal Protection in Remedial Doctrine 
In wrestling with remedies to cross-sectional equal protection violations, 
the Court has illustrated the shortcomings of that doctrine and the ways in 
which temporal equal protection can be more effective in promoting true 
equality of opportunity. Thus, even in implementing its most important 
initiative of the second half of the twentieth century, school desegregation,71 the 
Court was extremely hesitant to intervene forcefully in crafting remedies to the 
segregation it had found unlawful72 and hurried to extricate the federal courts 
despite risks of recurrent violations.73 
A central challenge in cross-sectional equal protection is determining what 
remedies are feasible. Courts naturally proceed cautiously when pressing the 
political branches to implement policies that may have unforeseeable side 
effects. The Court has thus shown great deference to states wishing to “address 
a problem ‘one step at a time,’ or even ‘select one phase of one field and apply 
a remedy there, neglecting the others,’”74 without much attention to whether 
the next “step” is ever taken. Because temporal equal protection seeks only to 
preserve existing policies, it is largely free of this difficulty. To be sure, current 
policy may have proven unsustainable or counterproductive since being 
implemented,75 but it should be subject to specific proofs rather than the 
necessarily speculative estimation of what new policies might do. 
 
 70. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 19–39, Miller v. Davis, 667 F. App’x 537 (6th Cir. 2016) (No. 
15-5880); Brief of Amicus Curiae Americans United for Separation of Church and State in Support of 
Appellees and Affirmance at 16–24, Miller, 667 F. App’x 537 (No. 15-5880); see also Miller v. Davis, 
123 F. Supp. 3d 924, 935–37 (E.D. Ky. 2015) (finding that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the 
merits of their substantive due process challenge to clerk’s policy), appeal dismissed as moot and cause 
remanded, 667 F. App’x 537. 
 71. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 72. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 27–29 (1971) (reluctantly 
authorizing more intrusive court-ordered remedies seventeen years after Brown). 
 73. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489–91 (1992) (embracing dissolution of remedies 
even while some violations remain); Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 
247 (1991) (approving dissolution of school desegregation decrees despite lingering concerns of 
parents). 
 74. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972) (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 
Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955)). 
 75. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320–21 (1977) (upholding more generous method 
of calculating women’s earnings records for Social Security purposes based on experience that the prior 
formula unduly favored men). 
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Prohibitions generally are less intrusive remedies than mandates even if 
some of the likely consequences may be similar.76 A meaningful mandate 
generally requires sufficient detail to allow its purposes to be effectuated; a 
prohibition could include such detail to guide future action in the same area, 
but it also can merely reject the action that has been undertaken without 
addressing whether similar actions would similarly be unlawful. 
Existing stasis-reinforcing doctrines lead to remedies and predictable 
secondary results quite different from those familiar from debates about change-
forcing doctrines. The Takings Clause, for example, tends to promote tax 
increases by prohibiting the government from forcing one or a few individuals 
to pay for public works that benefit broader society.77 It also prohibits economic 
redistribution of a particularly predatory type. In Stop the Beach Renourishment 
v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection,78 the plurality’s view that 
common law doctrines are entrenched by the Takings Clause has the effect of 
restricting what democratic majorities may do to change the law when it works 
to the disadvantage of others.79 The key difference here is that those doctrines 
tend to prevent majorities from disempowering those that already have wealth; 
temporal equal protection tends to protect those that wish to acquire wealth in 
the way other groups previously did. 
4.  Temporal Analysis in State Constitutional Law 
Some state courts have gone a bit further in exploring temporal equal 
protection. For example, some state constitutions prohibit “private and special 
laws,” in effect creating a specialized form of equal protection for 
municipalities.80 Exhibiting characteristic uneasiness about constitutional 
limitations on line drawing, courts have typically adopted minimum rationality 
analysis of de facto special legislation that avoids formal violations by creating 
classes of municipalities that, not coincidentally, often contain only a single 
municipality each.81 When, however, the legislature makes the ruse completely 
obvious by adjusting the class boundaries when a second municipality seems 
poised to enter, courts may intervene.82 In essence, courts are willing to allow 
cross-sectional privileging of one locality but not to allow that locality to lock 
in its preferred status over time. 
 
 76. See, e.g., Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 493 (1990) (disallowing mandatory relief 
to enforce civil rights where negative options had not been exhausted). 
 77. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 842 (1987) (warning against exactions 
leveraged with regulatory powers as a means of funding desirable public projects). 
 78. 560 U.S. 702 (2010). 
 79. See id. at 715.  
 80. See, e.g., S.D. CONST. art. III, § 23.  
 81. See, e.g., Secaucus v. Hudson Cty. Bd. of Taxation, 628 A.2d 288, 294 (N.J. 1993). 
 82. See id. at 297. 
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II.  CHALLENGES DESIGNING A TEMPORAL EQUAL PROTECTION 
DOCTRINE 
Many problems familiar from cross-sectional equal protection analysis will 
pose significant challenges to temporal equal protection. Some of these 
problems change significantly in the shift from cross-sectional to temporal 
analysis. And even when the problems are essentially the same in both contexts, 
it should not be a foregone conclusion that temporal equal protection, with its 
far less intrusive remedies and grounding in a broad tradition in constitutional 
stasis reinforcement, should apply the same rules in resolving those problems. 
This part explores some of the most prominent among these problems. 
A. Heightened Scrutiny 
Because line drawing is fundamental to all legislation and regulation, a 
cross-sectional equal protection doctrine that seriously scrutinized more than a 
tiny fraction of state decisions would be utterly unmanageable. One of the great 
struggles of cross-sectional equal protection has been to find a workable method 
for limiting which among the “many classifications” found in statutes the courts 
will scrutinize.83  
By contrast, policy changes, although pervasive, are far less numerous than 
line drawing. Moreover, the consequences of frustrating policy change are far 
less anti-democratic than those of preventing line drawing: when a court 
disallows a line drawn by the political branches, it produces a policy that no 
elected officials selected, while a court rejecting a new policy typically maintains 
one that elected officials previously designed.84 Thus, the need for means of 
limiting the policies that temporal equal protection will scrutinize is not nearly 
as pressing as was the corresponding quest in its cross-sectional counterpart. As 
discussed below,85 many other change-inhibiting doctrines rely on scrutiny-
enhancing principles quite different from those in cross-sectional equal 
protection. Instead, they identify a type of change that tends to be ill-considered 
or oppressive and scrutinize all actions of that type. Some of these grounds 
arguably are less important than vindicating the Constitution’s guarantees of 
equality. 
Still, denying the political branches the right to change policies is a 
significant intrusion that should not be undertaken commonly or casually. The 
 
 83. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963) (“Statutes create many classifications which do 
not deny equal protection; it is only ‘invidious discrimination’ which offends the Constitution.”). 
 84. This is not universally true. If the prior policy was the common law, or the lack of any state 
intervention because sufficient agreement on an intervention had previously proven impossible, 
voiding a new policy from the political branches would reduce self-governance. With the republic more 
than two centuries old, and the New Deal expansion of governmental regulation more than seven 
decades on, genuinely new laws and regulations are relatively rare, although they do exist. 
 85. See infra Section III.B. 
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prior electorate is not the same as the current one, and denying voters and their 
representatives the opportunity to change policies does impair majoritarian 
democracy. We should not multiply intrusions on the right to change without 
clear justification for doing so. Indeed, excessively obstructing the means of 
political change has been recognized as a justification for greater constitutional 
scrutiny.86 Moreover, far too much policy change occurs for judicial scrutiny to 
be feasible for more than a small fraction of the most important and potentially 
problematic actions. Finally, without reasonably clear principles about which 
actions are vulnerable to review, people may feel unable to rely upon newly 
enacted rules. 
The two most obvious starting points for focusing judicial scrutiny are the 
criteria Footnote 4 established for elevated scrutiny in cross-sectional equal 
protection and those that guide other change-inhibiting doctrines. Sections 
II.A.1 and II.A.2 consider the former; Section II.A.3, drawing on the analysis 
of Part III, seeks to distill possible focusing criteria from other change-
inhibiting doctrines. 
1.  Suspect and Semi-Suspect Classes 
The narrow definition of suspect classes for cross-sectional equal 
protection is a function of its model of the proper functions of government and 
how the political process might go awry. The basic model for cross-sectional 
equal protection since the Lochner era’s collapse has assumed that government 
is allocating consumption across the population. Because so many normative 
claims could be made for different allocations, and because we prefer allocative 
decisions to be made within the political process, courts generally defer to those 
decisions. 
Footnote 4 suggested more vigorous scrutiny of rules imposing different, 
disadvantageous rules on discrete and insular minorities because their ostracism 
prevents them from forming political coalitions with the ease that other groups 
enjoy. Heightened scrutiny for policy changes that have negative impacts on 
members of suspect or semi-suspect classes will accomplish little in temporal 
equal protection if it comes with the requirement that policymakers explicitly 
admit what they are doing. Because temporal discrimination is, by its very 
nature, facially neutral, almost all claims likely will depend on showings of 
disparate impacts. Several decades of cross-sectional equal protection and civil 
rights enforcement, primarily under rules that effectively require showing 
discriminatory intent, has trained bigots to cover their tracks. Efforts to remove 
benefits from members of politically marginalized groups rarely have the kind 
of fit the Court has required in cross-sectional cases. Withdrawals of previously 
available rights and benefits typically occur after the composition of the 
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benefiting population has changed only partially: some residual members of the 
dominant group will lose too. 
On the other hand, the same political disabilities that prevent discrete and 
insular minorities from resisting racial aggression in the form of established 
rules also prevent them from having an effective voice when the dominant 
group changes longstanding rules to prevent minorities from benefiting. Thus, 
the rationale for heightened scrutiny in cross-sectional equal protection would 
apply well to temporal discrimination. 
The problems of proving intent and closeness of fit look significantly 
different in temporal terms, where the potential volume and intrusiveness of 
cases—and hence the importance of these screens for limiting judicial intrusion 
on democratic processes—is reduced. Moreover, the focus is on one specific 
point of decision rather than on classifications that evolved and persisted over 
time. This may make importing concepts from general tort law easier in 
temporal cases than in cross-sectional ones. For example, temporal equal 
protection doctrine could require the party with the greatest access to the facts 
pertinent to an issue to carry the burden of producing evidence on that issue.87 
This seems especially timely in light of the Court’s new restrictions on 
plaintiffs’ ability to prove problematic intent through discovery.88 Indeed, the 
recent litigation concerning President Trump’s travel ban has shown that, even 
where such evidence exists, courts may find that the public interest in open 
political discourse counsels against using it.89 As discussed below,90 the Court’s 
stasis-reinforcing doctrines often function in the opposite way, forcing 
deliberation rather than dampening it. 
2.  Important Rights 
Another set of exceptions to the minimum rationality principle in cross-
sectional equal protection allows courts to intervene to prevent the political 
process from seizing up and locking one group into power for the long term. 
Cross-sectional equal protection’s scrutiny of infringements on fundamental 
rights has been focused on situations where no right need be provided at all but, 
once provided, it may not be offered to one group and not another. Although 
this has been theorized as preventing those in power from obstructing the 
 
 87. See Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687, 689 (Cal. 1944) (discussing the doctrine res ipsa 
loquitur). 
 88. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009); see Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1868–69 
(2017) (restricting a civil rights conspiracy statute to preserve the opportunity for candid conversation 
between government officials). 
 89. See generally Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir.) (considering 
whether campaign statements by the candidate ultimately elected President are admissible to show 
discriminatory intent), vacated as moot, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017). 
 90. See infra Section III.B.1.d. 
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channels of political change that could lead to their ouster,91 the Court has 
applied it to rights with little direct connections to political or economic 
change.92 Temporal equal protection can and should do much the same thing: 
examine situations where a right, previously bestowed, has been withdrawn. 
Consistent with the theorization of “fundamental rights” equal protection, 
and with temporal equal protection’s purpose of preventing those achieving 
success from denying similar opportunities to those coming behind them, 
temporal equal protection should be particularly energetic in scrutinizing 
withdrawals of rivalrous rights. Some rules and public programs confer absolute 
benefits on those receiving them but do not directly diminish the positions of 
others. When a public art museum buys new paintings, it brightens the days of 
those that visit the museum, but it does not harm or undermine those that do 
not. Nor will the museum’s closure obstruct opportunities for political or 
economic change. By contrast, when the government facilitates the speech of 
one group but not another, or makes it easier for one group to win public office, 
it increases the chances that their opponents’ policy preferences will be rejected. 
Temporal equal protection analysis is most crucial where a right is 
rivalrous. If the state allows you to speak your mind but then shuts down the 
forum before I can respond, you are likely to gain a lasting advantage over me. 
If elections are conducted under rules that favor you and then those rules 
disappear when conditions change so that they would favor me, I will have less 
opportunity to reverse the policies you installed with your augmented 
representation. Some benefits are indirectly rivalrous. Charles Reich showed 
that having large numbers of people dependent on the government for 
occupational licenses, transfer payments, and other “largesse” prevents them 
from participating in politics on an equal footing with fellow citizens relying on 
legally protected property rights.93 If one group receives the head start of a 
superior education for a while and then further educational opportunities are 
equalized, the former group will have a persistent advantage in competing for 
jobs. 
Benefits can be rivalrous cross-sectionally or temporally. When we apply 
for admission to school, we are competing cross-sectionally. But ultimately, we 
will be competing for jobs with people who went to school at different times 
from us. Similarly, although voting is obviously rivalrous in a cross-sectional 
sense—with one more vote for my side generally being equivalent to one less 
vote for yours—voting is also rivalrous temporally, as a new majority can seek 
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to override the decisions of an old one. An electoral system that produces clear 
majorities in one period and then shifts to producing muddled ones in the next 
will favor the dominant group in the first period even if the right to vote saw 
no cross-sectional discrimination in either period. 
Conversely, changes in rules concerning non-rivalrous benefits are more 
likely to have legitimate rationales—such as changing tastes—and, because they 
typically do less harm to disfavored groups, may be less likely to have malicious 
motives.94 This is particularly true where the non-rivalrous benefit is, in some 
sense, a luxury. Our society has grown sufficiently affluent such that a 
substantial share of government policies convey benefits that are real but not 
truly vital.95 Changes in these policies typically do less harm and hence have a 
less compelling case for judicial scrutiny. Again, a municipality that stops 
purchasing new art for its museum could legitimately have decided that the 
public would benefit more if it shifted those funds to parks and recreational 
programs.96 
Some rights can be non-rivalrous under some circumstances but rivalrous 
under others. John Locke’s famous formulation of property rights only claims 
to apply so long as access to property is non-rivalrous97: once there is no longer 
enough, and as good, for others, the principle that mixing labor with land should 
yield property rights becomes much harder to defend. It will produce an elite, 
wealthy class while property-owning opportunities exist but then insulate its 
members from competition once it becomes more difficult to obtain land.98 
Another distinction crucial to temporal equal protection is between 
changes whose primary impact is transitory and those affecting long-term 
interests. Stasis-reinforcing doctrines generally address major threats to 
individuals’ capital;99 they are relatively lenient about impairments of the 
 
 94. Of course, where other bases for enhanced scrutiny exist, temporal equal protection could call 
into question the termination of non-rivalrous rights. A public art museum that closes when forced to 
open its doors to all races will have used public funds to serve only whites. 
 95. CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: NON-DEFENSE 
DISCRETIONARY PROGRAMS 3 (2019) https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/
atoms/files/PolicyBasics-NDD.pdf [https://perma.cc/J45H-NTZ2] (finding that only thirteen percent 
of federal non-defense discretionary spending goes to programs targeting low-income populations). 
 96. Of course, if this shift occurred after the museum came under pressure to diversify its 
collection with works from African, African American, or Hispanic artists, it would be far more suspect. 
 97. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 19 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett 
Publ’g Co. 1980) (1690). 
 98. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 2–3 (1999) 
(arguing that liberal democracy depends on keeping open opportunities to acquire substantial capital); 
THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 6 (2014) (finding increasing 
concentrations of wealth over time absent strong public policies seeking to preserve opportunity). 
 99. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 340 (1976). But see First English Evangelical Lutheran 
Church v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 322 (1987) (finding a taking in a temporary but complete 
deprivation of property rights). 
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current return capital produces.100 Separation of powers and federalism, too, 
impose tighter constraints on major policy changes—typically embodied in 
statutes—and impingements on state common law rights101 than they do on 
more transitory policy changes implemented through regulations or other 
executive actions. And where those agencies can act, procedural due process 
constrains them more heavily where weightier interests are at stake.102 Courts 
can block withdrawals of education that “strike at the heart of equal protection 
values by involving the State in the creation of permanent class distinctions”103 
without immersing themselves in the details of how most public services are 
provided. This distinction seems far more important for preserving temporal 
equity than that between recognized “fundamental rights” and everything else. 
Discontinuing elections for drain commissioner or reducing the venues 
available for commercial speech does nothing to stratify society, unlike gutting 
the public schools or abruptly discontinuing a subsistence benefit program to 
leave former recipients desperate and dependent.104 
Finally, temporal equal protection, like both cross-sectional equal 
protection105 and other change-inhibiting doctrines,106 should distinguish 
between impairments of rights and their complete elimination. Thus, for 
example, the elimination of municipal elections after a city’s voters become 
predominately minority could raise serious concerns, but the assignment of a 
few modest additional duties to an existing unelected city manager likely would 
not. 
3.  Criteria from Other Change-Inhibiting Doctrines 
Some of the norms common to other change-inhibiting doctrines reflect 
generalized suspicion of hasty policymaking. That would argue for greater 
scrutiny of policy changes generally. Sometimes, policymakers must act quickly 
 
 100. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 413–14 (1915) (finding no taking in land-use 
regulations that prevented use of brickyard). 
 101. See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982) 
(prohibiting tribunals constituted outside of Article III from trying questions of state common law). 
 102. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335. 
 103. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 234 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 104. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (concluding that those losing welfare benefits 
often will be too desperate to advocate for themselves effectively); BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. 
FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY 189 (2004) (describing the deleterious effects of economic dependence 
on democratic participation). Of course, not all government benefits are crucial to individuals’ survival. 
See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 340–41 (finding terminations of disability benefits less devastating than those 
of means-tested subsistence aid). 
 105. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 25 n.60 (1973) (suggesting 
that a complete deprivation of education might receive more exacting scrutiny). 
 106. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992) (finding an 
unconstitutional taking whenever a regulation destroys the entire value of property). 
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to respond to an entirely new kind of crisis, even if they make hasty errors. 
Changing existing rules can be similarly urgent but often will not be. 
Others, however, reflect a far greater willingness to contemplate the 
machinery of the state being hijacked for private, self-interested, or malicious 
ends than cross-sectional equal protection has shown.107 In particular, change-
inhibiting doctrines openly and unabashedly address majoritarian abuses 
directed at people on the basis of their economic classes.108 This is true both of 
substantive rules, such as the Takings and Contracts Clauses, and of the 
Constitution’s structural provisions, which were deliberately designed to 
prevent numeric majorities from redistributing the wealth of the more 
affluent.109 
Once one recognizes the possibility of one economic group harnessing the 
power of the state to pursue class warfare, however, the concept of equal 
protection obliges us to consider it being waged by other economic classes.110 
The Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence emphatically rejects the notion 
that policies favoring one side of a social divide may be acceptable while those 
favoring the other are proscribed.111 Recent experience has shown that economic 
elites can wield their dominance over mass communications to enact measures 
that sharply redistribute wealth to them from impoverished people.112 James 
Madison, although famously concerned that the masses would redistribute from 
the wealthy,113 also warned against allowing the elite to dominate political 
 
 107. See infra Section III.B.1. 
 108. This unwillingness to recognize class conflicts, and to understand the Constitution as seeking 
to manage them for the general good of society, is arguably an anachronism. See GANESH SITARAMAN, 
THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS CONSTITUTION 8–9 (2017) (arguing that the Framers 
deliberately designed the Constitution to manage class conflict constructively). 
 109. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (describing the separation of powers 
as frustrating populist mob sentiments). 
 110. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to 
all race-based preferences, not just those favoring whites); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 
U.S. 469, 499 (1989) (rejecting argument that historical discrimination against African Americans 
justified government contract preferences favoring them). 
 111. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978). 
 112. For example, President Reagan in 1981–82 and Speaker Gingrich in 1995–97 paired large tax 
cuts disproportionately benefiting upper-income people with severe cuts in anti-poverty programs. 
David A. Super, The Cruelty of Trump’s Poverty Policy, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/24/opinion/trump-poverty-policy.html [https://perma.cc/ZZ4S-
875D (dark archive)]. President George W. Bush similarly enacted tax cuts skewed heavily to the 
affluent in 2001 and 2003 and then, when the deficit grew, sought to offset some of their costs with 
cuts primarily to low-income programs in the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–171, 120 
Stat. 4 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (2006). Paul Krugman, The Tax-Cut 
Con, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 14, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/14/magazine/the-tax-cut-
con.html [https://perma.cc/MSW5-QPL9 (dark archive)]. 
 113. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 29, at 42 (James Madison). 
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debates114 and victimize less-affluent people.115 The current situation also would 
not surprise Alexander Hamilton, who anticipated that some classes would have 
disproportionate representation in the federal government.116 
Temporal equal protection, like other stasis-reinforcing doctrines, should 
recognize government as allocating the means of acquiring further wealth. This 
function can be achieved in numerous ways, with the political process ordinarily 
trustworthy to make, and remake, the necessary normative choices. The 
allocation of productive resources, however, can ossify the social, economic, and 
political order if an elite wields state power to block or destabilize potential 
competitors. Here, choking off the means of political competition is one 
concern, but choking off access to economic opportunity is another. Because a 
key norm of temporal equal protection is to give everyone similar opportunities 
to climb the ladder to success, we should be particularly sensitive to policies 
that relate to social and economic mobility, even if in cross-sectional equal 
protection analysis these might be dismissed as mere “economic and social 
regulations.” 
B. Adequacy of Justification 
Closely linked to the question of what circumstances should trigger 
enhanced scrutiny is what that scrutiny should entail. Where a distinction is 
temporal, the rationality of the new policy is one possible measure of 
justification for a change but not the only obvious one. Courts could demand 
that those defending a policy change that is subject to scrutiny demonstrate a 
substantial change in conditions, knowledge, or philosophy that could rationally 
motivate the policy change. Thus, for example, a public program might be 
withdrawn if the government experiences a major deterioration in its fiscal 
condition,117 if research or public outcry suggests that the program is not 
working, or if the electorate moves broadly to a more libertarian, “small 
government” philosophy. 
Of course, something always has changed. As easy as it is to conjure make-
weight arguments in favor of classifications, that task may be even easier in 
support of policy changes. Temporal equal protection would mean little if it 
had to stand aside for every random, modest increase in the costs of a 
 
 114. THE FEDERALIST NO. 54, supra note 29, at 267 (James Madison). 
 115. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 29, at 181 (James Madison). 
 116. THE FEDERALIST NO. 35, supra note 29, at 103 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 117. When Tombstone, Arizona, lost over ninety percent of its population after silver prices 
tumbled in the mid-1880s, it obviously could not continue to maintain the same level of public services. 
See U.S. Census Bureau History: Gunfight at the O.K. Corral, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Oct. 2016), 
https://www.census.gov/history/www/homepage_archive/2016/october_2016.html 
[https://perma.cc/V6WR-XV65]. 
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government service, every half-baked, back-of-the-envelope study, and every 
selectively applied purported philosophical conversion. 
To address this vulnerability, temporal equal protection should 
supplement the principle of rationality with that of generality. Claims that new 
conditions drove policy changes disadvantaging vulnerable groups or important 
rights will be far more credible if those same conditions simultaneously drove 
other policy changes affecting members of dominant groups.118 A state’s policy 
changing in response to critical reports about a program serving members of 
disfavored groups would be more plausible if the state commonly commissioned 
and acted upon similar studies of programs serving the dominant population 
and if its criticism of the program is relatively consistent.119 And a philosophical 
change that leads to withdrawals of services from affluent, powerful 
communities is far more plausible than one that manifests itself only 
whimsically when politically disempowered people are involved.120 
This latter point is crucial. If temporal equal protection were to become 
simply a new “one-way ratchet” that entrenched government interventions once 
enacted, ideological conservatives would hotly oppose it. Similarly, if it 
prevented the removal of unjustifiable burdens when they began to affect 
members of the dominant group, the electorate would regard it as mindlessly 
self-destructive. For example, the opioid epidemic, and its prevalence in white 
communities, is causing reconsideration of the harsh, insensitive way we have 
treated substance abusers for decades when the electorate viewed them as 
primarily members of racial and ethnic minority groups.121 Particularly given 
the widespread reliance on images of drug abuse to stigmatize members of those 
groups,122 the impetus for this change derives at least in part from race.123 
 
 118. Thus, for example, reductions in state aid to K-12 education at a time when public schools’ 
white enrollment is declining might look more like a plausible response to a budget crisis, rather than 
temporal discrimination, if the state cut funding for its elite public universities, with overwhelmingly 
white student bodies, at the same time. 
 119. Recent Republican efforts to cut Medicaid for low-income people in the name of reducing 
overall medical costs would be more plausible as a reaction to the program’s shortcomings if the same 
legislation did not expand tax preferences for high-cost private health care plans. See, e.g., Tony Nitti, 
GOP Health Care Bill Will Result in a Huge Tax Cut for the Rich, 24 Million Without Insurance, FORBES 
(Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/anthonynitti/2017/03/13/gop-health-care-bill-will-
result-in-a-huge-tax-cut-for-the-rich-24-million-without-insurance/ [https://perma.cc/GXR8-C6LS]. 
 120. Thus, expanding subsidies to agribusiness while reducing food aid to low-income people 
would seem a strange way to manifest a commitment to small government and non-intervention in 
markets. 
 121. Indeed, we have frequently seen this pattern in the regulation of psychoactive substances 
when the racial composition of users changes. See German Lopez, When a Drug Epidemic’s Victims Are 
White, VOX (Apr. 4, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/4/4/15098746/opioid-
heroin-epidemic-race [https://perma.cc/ECF4-5EX5]. 
 122. See MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP 107 (2001).  
 123. See Mary Crossley, Opioids and Converging Interests, 49 SETON HALL L. REV. 1019, 1026–29 
(2019).  
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Similarly, when the Great Depression brought mass unemployment to the 
middle-class, social insurance programs that had been dismissed as socialist 
became bulwarks of freedom.124 We finally moved against predatory lenders 
when they ran out of victims in poor and minority communities and started 
cheating large numbers of middle-class whites, triggering the Great 
Recession.125 Yet locking in existing policies until whites have somehow suffered 
comparable harms to those experienced by people of color would be to reject 
the idea of democratic progress. 
Temporal equal protection should allow a consistent philosophical change 
toward a public health response to substance abuse; it should not, however, 
allow changing these laws only when and to the extent that they affect whites. 
If, for example, draconian laws still apply to drugs that have yet to penetrate 
the white community, or if the federal government were to allow states waivers 
of its laws and received applications only from states with many white addicts, 
that would be difficult to assign to a philosophical change. Just as temporal 
concerns have played a role in remedies for violations of cross-sectional equal 
protection, so too cross-sectional analysis is pertinent to remedies for violations 
of temporal equal protection. 
Although the systematic treatment of justifications for changes is new to 
equal protection doctrine, it long has been the subject of vigorous debate in 
administrative law. Justice Breyer articulated a plausible standard for 
justification of policy changes in his dissent in FCC v. Fox Television Stations126: 
[T]he law require[s] an explanation for such a change because the earlier 
policy, representing a settled course of behavior, embodies the agency’s 
informed judgment that, by pursuing that course, it will carry out the 
policies best if the settled rule is adhered to. Thus, the agency must 
explain why it has come to the conclusion that it should now change 
direction. Why does it now reject the considerations that led it to adopt 
that initial policy? What has changed in the world that offers justification 
for the change? What other good reasons are there for departing from 
the earlier policy?127 
Justice Breyer emphasized that he was not proposing a heightened 
standard of review: 
[T]he law requires application of the same standard of review to different 
circumstances, namely, circumstances characterized by the fact that 
change is at issue. It requires the agency to focus upon the fact of change 
 
 124. See MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE 213–23 (1986).  
 125. See Alex Gano, Disparate Impact and Mortgage Lending: A Beginner’s Guide, 88 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1109, 1126–28 (2017).  
 126. 556 U.S. 502 (2009). 
 127. Id. at 550 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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where change is relevant, just as it must focus upon any other relevant 
circumstance. It requires the agency here to focus upon the reasons that 
led the agency to adopt the initial policy, and to explain why it now 
comes to a new judgment.128 
And, of course, the legitimate justification must have been evident in the 
agency’s deliberations, not the kind of post hoc rationalization by counsel 
commonly offered to defeat cross-sectional equal protection claims.129 
The lack of funds to continue a prior policy might suffice as a justification 
if the financial shortfall is real and demonstrable. Failure to recognize such 
justifications would put declining governments in fiscal straightjackets. On the 
other hand, although its rate of growth has stagnated since about 2000—and, 
more broadly, since the early 1970s130—the U.S. economy (and those of most of 
its states) continues to grow and hence to have more resources available than it 
did in prior years. Fiscal decline that is the result of conscious decisions to 
reduce revenues is not the same thing as an inability to pay. Thus, for example, 
a state’s failure to fund equal numbers of voting machines per voter in low- and 
high-income jurisdictions when it mandates new voting technology cannot 
plausibly be blamed on inadequate resources. 
In addition, policy changes that exacerbate well-known problems, such as 
residential segregation,131 should be entitled to a lesser presumption of 
legitimacy than novel impacts policymakers could not be expected to anticipate. 
C. State Action 
An increasingly important means of disadvantaging vulnerable groups is 
to withdraw state action altogether. One of the most shameful episodes in U.S. 
history since the abolition of slavery—the end of Reconstruction and the 
abandonment of the freed slaves—involved state inaction, not state action. To 
be sure, the revanchist governments that took over after Union soldiers left 
cooperated heavily with the Klan and major landowners to a degree that the 
courts could certainly have found state action.132 Even without such evidence, 
however, the mere act of withdrawing the state’s protective role was invidious: 
 
 128. Id. 
 129. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943). See generally Allentown Mack Sales & 
Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998) (refusing to consider legality of new policy that NLRB did 
not explicitly adopt). 
 130. PIKETTY, supra note 98, at 94.  
 131. See generally, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal 
Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385 (1977) (finding that “anti-sprawl” rules function like exclusionary zoning). 
 132. See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 82 U.S. 542, 553–54 (1875) (finding no constitutional 
violation when Louisiana’s government stood by as a white mob massacred over 100 African Americans 
defending an elected local government); ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL 
INTERPRETATION 142–44 (2005) (describing entanglement between the mob and purported white 
officeholders). 
98 N.C. L. REV. 59 (2019) 
88 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98 
knowing that the socially and economically dominant group would prevail easily 
if merely left alone meant that racist state officials had no need to take direct 
action against the freed slaves themselves. 
Similar problems abound today. Efforts to rebuild communities of color 
devastated by Hurricane Katrina were clearly anemic, and many suspected that 
the race of the victims was key.133 Similar concerns have been raised after recent 
hurricanes.134 Except in the unlikely event of two comparable disasters occurring 
simultaneously, cross-sectional analysis is useless to show discrimination. But 
temporal equal protection can note that state responses were far more robust to 
prior disasters that struck areas with predominately white populations. 
The essence of the Black Lives Matter movement’s complaint is that the 
state turns its back on acts that it would have prosecuted had whites been the 
victims.135 Rarely can advocates point to contemporaneous cases with white 
victims that were handled more aggressively. This severely undermines the 
prospects of a cross-sectional equal protection claim even if they could obtain 
standing. On the other hand, advocates might be able to show that prosecutors’ 
caution appears to be of relatively recent origin and that the tenor of police 
training has shifted from caution to aggression. 
More generally, a broad effort to privatize government functions and 
services136 is occurring at the same time that much of the electorate is coming 
to view those services as disproportionately benefiting low-income people, 
specifically people of color.137 This withdrawal of the public role often is 
difficult to justify on economic grounds138 and reduces opportunities for those 
facing racial or other animus in the private sector. It also reduces the number 
of actors in the social and economic sphere bound by norms of equal 
treatment.139 
 
 133. See Super, New New Property, supra note 93, at 1824–25.  
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Just as the Court scrutinizes withdrawals of aid more closely under the 
Due Process Clauses than it does denials of aid,140 a temporal equal protection 
claim against the reduction or elimination of a public service should be regarded 
as state action even if the state had no duty to provide the service in the first 
place. 
D. Entrenchment 
One challenge in crafting a temporal equal protection doctrine that does 
not have an obvious analogue in cross-sectional equal protection analysis is the 
question of how long policies must be entrenched before giving rise to a claim. 
The mere passage of a law surely is not sufficient: many laws are repealed prior 
to taking effect, and others have quite tepid impacts, especially in their early 
stages. More broadly, many laws fairly rapidly prove to be bad ideas. The 
explosion of virtue that proponents imagined would result from Prohibition 
failed to materialize; an explosion of lawlessness did.141 The Medicare 
Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 proved politically catastrophic and was 
quickly repealed after prospective beneficiaries rebelled against the required 
premiums.142 Removal of rights and entitlements, even after some people have 
begun to enjoy them, is a normal part of the governing process. Popular 
constitutionalists recognize that great acts do not fundamentally change the 
nation until after some period of entrenchment.143 Clearly temporal equal 
protection needs some similar concept of when a right or benefit has become 
sufficiently imbedded in our legal culture that its elimination deserves scrutiny. 
Of course, if one limits one’s attention to longstanding laws, one faces the 
opposite problem: laws that have outlived their usefulness or that have been 
bypassed by changes in society. We certainly cannot return to the nineteenth 
century’s “vested rights” doctrine preventing the repeal of any rights-granting 
statute once enacted. Whatever the needs of the fledgling aviation industry, by 
the end the Civil Aeronautics Board had lost its way.144 Few mourned when the 
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National School Lunch Program largely supplanted previous haphazard 
commodity distribution efforts.145 
Part of the answer, again paralleling other stasis-preserving doctrines, is 
to seek to identify reliance interests. Some laws are designed to encourage 
reliance—the Affordable Care Act’s explicit goal was to eliminate 
uninsuredness among U.S. citizens—while others are clearly not designed or 
funded to meet more than a fraction of the demands placed on them.146 Also, 
different laws become known to and relied upon by large segments of the public 
at different speeds. Conversely, as laws outlive their usefulness, fewer and fewer 
may rely upon them or those reliance interests that the laws do create may be 
more easily covered by replacement policies. 
A related problem is how to respond to gradual erosions of rights. 
Consider a police force that cuts back its patrols in a community three percent 
per year after the community’s composition starts to shift away from the 
dominant group. Eventually that community will be essentially unprotected, 
but no single year’s reduction will be demonstrably catastrophic. Viewed over a 
decade or two, this would be a clear withdrawal of police services, but in the 
meantime those resources have gradually been reallocated elsewhere, perhaps 
building reliance interests. Consistent with temporal equal protection’s stasis-
reinforcing character, a court may be disinclined to do more than enjoin the 
latest reduction and any further cutbacks, leaving much of the damage in place. 
This certainly is a weakness, and one that some are likely to exploit, just as 
gradual accretions of regulatory burdens may destroy much of a property’s value 
without triggering the Takings Clause. This possibility does not eliminate the 
value of temporal equal protection: to evade scrutiny in this way, the dominant 
group must repeat its slights again and again, facing political criticism each time, 
and will fail if it either does too much—showing its hand—or loses its 
commitment to the project along the way. In this way, temporal equal 
protection complements other, structural stasis-preserving doctrines. 
E. The Paradox of Equal Protection 
Many important rights contain important paradoxes. The potential 
tensions between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses are well-known: 
as the state plays a larger role in our lives, it will have such control over spaces 
that it will determine whether religious activity occurs there—with either result 
at least superficially raising concerns. We have resolved that pragmatically, 
 
 145. See, e.g., JANET POPPENDIECK, FREE FOR ALL: FIXING SCHOOL FOOD IN AMERICA 48–53 
(2010) (describing how that change improved the accessibility and nutritional quality of school meals).  
 146. For example, the Legal Services Corporation Act has never come close to guaranteeing access 
to civil representation to any category of low-income people, no matter how meritorious their cases 
may be. See Katja Cerovsek & Kathleen Kerr, Comment, Opening the Doors to Justice: Overcoming the 
Problem of Inadequate Representation for the Indigent, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 697, 697–98 (2004). 
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understanding that devoting law enforcement resources to combatting 
religiously motivated hate crimes is not the establishment of religion but rather 
the defense of the secular values of safety and freedom. Similarly, if freedom of 
speech extends to the point of entitling someone to shout down all opposing 
voices, its communicative values would be destroyed. And if we read the Due 
Process Clause as demanding such intricate procedures that no decision is ever 
reached, we will not have fair resolutions of disputes over life, liberty, or 
property. 
Equal protection, both cross-sectional and temporal, has its own 
paradoxes. Understanding the paradox of each form of equal protection sheds 
light on the other. 
For cross-sectional equal protection, the paradox is that perfect equality 
can lock in the results of past discrimination. Thus, insisting on color-blind 
college admissions policies after decades in which whites, but not African 
Americans or Hispanic Americans, were educated is likely to preserve a strong 
advantage for the children of better-educated white parents. Gender-blind 
hiring policies may start to bring a few women into previously all-male enclaves, 
but entrenched “old boys’” networks may make success much harder for those 
women than it is for men hired at the same time. In essence, although it is 
equality-diminishing to treat members of marginalized groups as inherently 
unequal, it is also equality-diminishing to ignore the differences that result from 
social and political discrimination. 
Temporal equal protection analysis makes the problem clear. Judged over 
an extended period, the sequence of discrimination favoring the dominant 
group followed by purported legal equality still awards the vast majority of 
benefits to those in the dominant group. Put another way, allowing race 
preferences when they favor whites but insisting on color-blindness when 
affirmative action would favor people of color is an obvious deprivation of 
temporal equal protection—all the more so when the nominally color-blind 
criteria tend to favor the beneficiaries of prior discrimination. 
But temporal equal protection contains its own paradox, too. If we inhibit 
important policy changes too aggressively, we will frustrate newly ascendant 
majorities formed by historically marginalized people, alone or in coalition with 
others. Here, theory developed for cross-sectional equal protection provides 
insight. If one understands the purpose of equal protection to be blocking the 
formation of dominant and subordinate groups,147 then one should react very 
differently to policy changes instituted by those who had been systematically 
excluded from power than from a relatively constant dominant group adjusting 
 
 147. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 157–
59 (1976) (arguing that equal protection should be viewed as “group-disadvantaging” conduct and 
“status-harm”). 
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policy as conditions change to preserve its own prerogatives. Just as cross-
sectional equal protection can be counterproductive when it ignores real 
differences imposed by social, political, or economic forces, so too temporal 
equal protection could be counterproductive when it ignores real political 
change. 
The focus of temporal equal protection, then, should be on policy changes 
in response to demographic changes or legal or political changes that make 
cross-sectional discrimination infeasible. The former is widely recognized as 
hypocrisy. The latter reflects a common suspicion of the good faith of parties 
forced to change their ways after having been found liable for wrongdoing. 
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES LIMITING POLICY CHANGE 
Constitutional doctrines can roughly be sorted into three groups: those 
that force change, those that prevent change, and those that may be applied 
either to force or to prevent change. Ours is a deeply conservative Constitution, 
with many more change-inhibiting doctrines than change-promoting ones.148 
Nonetheless, because the Lochner era partially discredited the use of 
constitutional law to inhibit change, and because the Civil Rights Era gave 
legitimacy and prestige to the application of constitutional law to force change, 
the popular understanding of constitutional law tends to be the reverse.149 Thus, 
in the typical equal protection case, plaintiffs challenge a longstanding policy as 
discriminatory on a cross-sectional basis and, if they win, may have to litigate 
how quickly the new, non-discriminatory regime must be implemented.150 
But an important class of constitutional rules have nearly the opposite 
structure: obstructing or striking down changes to longstanding policies more 
favorable to particular communities.151 As much as change dominates the 
headlines and our political discourse, our legal system broadly assumes temporal 
stability in both law and social order. These rules treat continuity in legal rules 
as the norm, with change an aberration requiring special adjustments. Temporal 
equal protection would fit neatly into this group. 
Although overriding legislative line drawing and overriding legislative 
efforts to change policy are both anti-majoritarian, the latter is less disruptive 
 
 148. Relatively few constitutional doctrines are explicitly limited to forcing change. See, e.g., U.S. 
CONST. amend. XXII (limiting terms of the President); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (requiring appropriations 
for the army to be renewed every two years). 
 149. In addition, over the last century, constitutional dissonance has been as likely to come from 
developments in constitutional thinking that move it out of sync with current practices as from new 
practices that depart from settled constitutional rules. 
 150. See, e.g., Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cty., 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968) (requiring board 
to integrate schools “promptly”); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958) (denying Little Rock 
additional time to integrate despite rampant violence). 
 151. Larry Alexander’s dismissal of “very limited freezing principles” is typical of legal 
scholarship’s neglect of these rules’ significance. Alexander, supra note 8, at 399. 
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to democratic governance for several reasons. In particular, it leaves in place 
policies entirely designed by the elected branches and their appointees rather 
than imposing judge-made rules. It also commonly limits only the method of 
achieving the policy goal rather than disallowing effort to achieve that goal at 
all. 
This substantially more moderate anti-majoritarian impact of inhibiting 
legislative change has allowed change-inhibiting doctrines to develop much 
more fully than those, principally cross-sectional equal protection, that inhibit 
line drawing. Each of these doctrines has the same function as temporal equal 
protection: preventing the elected branches from changing policies. 
Understanding the principles they rely upon to justify that intrusion and how 
far they are prepared to go in obstructing democratic change is therefore 
instructive. In assessing the potential strengths and weaknesses of recognizing 
temporal equal protection, these doctrines provide far more realistic examples 
than does cross-sectional equal protection, which relies on strikingly different 
methods. 
This part analyzes important themes in doctrines impeding potentially 
oppressive legal change and seeks to apply them to understand how a robust 
temporal equal protection doctrine might be designed and justified against the 
kinds of criticisms that have restrained its cross-sectional counterpart. Section 
III.A briefly reviews the most important stasis-reinforcing doctrines. Section 
III.B seeks to extract key themes from that diverse collection. 
A. Existing Stasis-Reinforcing Doctrines 
Cross-sectional equal protection requires courts to perform a highly 
unusual function: prohibiting the political branches from drawing lines. To be 
sure, rules of uniform treatment have long governed innkeepers and common 
carriers. True also, the original Constitution had uniformity requirements for 
naturalization rules, bankruptcy, and certain taxes,152 and some state 
constitutions contain generality requirements153 or prohibitions on special and 
local legislation.154 In general, however, courts have recognized line drawing as 
a quintessential legislative and administrative function to be intruded upon only 
hesitantly.155 
By contrast, temporal equal protection asks courts to take on a much more 
familiar role: impeding problematic legal change. When courts do so, they 
generally need not substitute their own preferences for those of the political 
branch but merely continue one regime that previously won political support 
 
 152. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 4. 
 153. E.g., KAN. CONST. art. II, § 17. 
 154. E.g., N.J. CONST. art. VII, cl. 9. 
 155. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 238 (1981); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 
Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). 
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rather than allow another to supersede it. A wide array of constitutional and 
non-constitutional doctrines routinely assign courts that role, often with 
relatively little controversy. Temporal equal protection therefore demands not 
so much that courts engage in a new type of intrusion on majoritarian politics 
but rather that they do what they already are doing in service of a new purpose. 
Indeed, given the relatively onerous demands cross-sectional analysis places on 
the courts, it is surprising that it has so thoroughly dominated equal protection 
discourse. 
This section surveys some of the more important doctrines inhibiting 
majoritarian legal change. Section III.A.1 considers the anti-majoritarian role 
of rules, most of them content-neutral, that obstruct policy change generally. 
Section III.A.2 assesses rules that disallow particular methods of withdrawing 
beneficial legal treatment. In some situations, barring those methods of change 
effectively prevents change altogether; in others, policy change may proceed 
but only in ways that avoid specific kinds of impositions on individuals. These 
rules, like temporal equal protection, are indifferent to the creation of beneficial 
legal rules but, once enacted, proscribe their removal by a majority at the 
disproportionate expense of a minority. Section III.A.3 then notes that 
constitutional law, even in doctrinal areas that nominally do not address legal 
change, has in fact skewed against changes in legal rules. Section III.B then 
gathers together common themes from this discussion. 
1.  Governmental Structure 
Although the structures by which law may be changed are predominately 
content-neutral, they nonetheless impede legal change. Even where a majority 
of the current electorate favors change, these structures may prevent that 
change from occurring. This occurs in four ways. First, some rules require 
supermajorities to change but not to continue policy. They may require this of 
the supermajority explicitly or may do so by testing majority support in several 
different ways. A bare majority of the electorate is unlikely to measure up as 
such under either of these methods. The result, in effect, is to obstruct changes 
not supported by some sort of supermajority. Second, some rules require proof 
of majority support at multiple times, requiring a majority to prevail in several 
successive elections. Again, although a small but stable majority might be able 
to achieve this, more likely this would require some sort of supermajority to 
prevail in all of the necessary contests. Third, some rules require approvals for 
new (but not continued) policies by entities that are not directly controlled by 
majorities. And fourth, many rules reinforce the existing legal regime merely 
by increasing the amount of work required to achieve change. Some of these 
burdens are deliberate efforts to dampen change; others create burdens as 
byproducts of other functions. 
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By applying these constraints to the making of new policy but not the 
continuation of old, all of these rules tend to inhibit legal change. They increase 
the likelihood that people in the future will experience the same legal burdens 
and benefits as those that went before them even if a majority has come to prefer 
otherwise. 
a. Separation of Powers 
The Framers recognized, with approval, that the requirements of 
bicameralism and presentment would interfere with rapid changes in law.156 
Madison conceded in Federalist No. 10 that dangerous factions may at times 
command majority support but believed the federal government is designed to 
prevent them from making dangerous changes in the law.157 By requiring the 
assent of two bodies selected in different ways and following different processes, 
he anticipated in Federalist No. 52 the failure of proposals for change that could 
prevail in one approach or the other.158 In Federalist Nos. 62 and 63, he foresaw 
the Senate as a guardian of the status quo.159 Similarly, Hamilton in Federalist 
No. 73 embraced the presidential veto as a guard “against the effects of faction, 
precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may 
happen to influence a majority” of Congress.160 In Federalist No. 78, he 
anticipated that courts would “disregard” laws that differed from the “superior” 
law of the Constitution.161 More broadly, however, the Framers saw the 
Constitution as entrenching the current legal regime against “the mischiefs of 
. . . inconstancy and mutability in the laws”162 and the “poison[ing of] the 
blessings of liberty” that “mutable policy” brings.163 Even if some good, public-
serving laws were lost in the process, that is the price that we should gladly pay 
to block pernicious legal change.164 Gridlock is not a bug; it is a feature. 
As anticipated, our separation of powers has, indeed, strongly inhibited 
legal change by entrenching current legal rules unless advocates of change can 
navigate multiple institutional chokepoints or “vetogates,” each requiring them 
to demonstrate majority support measured in a different, non-overlapping 
 
 156. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 29, at 252–54 (James Madison). 
 157. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 29, at 43–45 (James Madison). See generally THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay) (arguing that a national government will be less likely than individual 
states to make decisions damaging to the country as a whole). 
 158. THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, supra note 29, at 259 (James Madison); see also THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 62, supra note 28, at 301 (James Madison). 
 159. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 29, at 307–08 (James Madison); see also THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 28, at 302 (James Madison) (noting that the Senate’s size and tenure 
make it less likely to act based on sudden passions). 
 160. THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 29, at 358 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 161. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 29, at 380 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 162. THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 29, at 359 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 163. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 29, at 304 (James Madison). 
 164. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 29, at 359 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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way.165 The requirements of bicameralism and presentment prevent changes in 
existing law unless the change is broadly acceptable or the faction promoting it 
has won several successive elections.166 The nonconstitutional requirement to 
obtain sixty votes in the Senate to achieve cloture on legislation, and the 
increasing willingness to force the majority to find sixty votes even on routine 
matters, further limits changes in policy.167 Executive orders and other 
presidential policies, once issued, persist from administration to administration, 
with new presidents lacking the attention and staff to review and reverse all but 
a handful of their predecessors’ decisions.168 Many states have still further 
change-inhibiting legislative169 and administrative170 procedures. 
The counterexamples are sparse and of relatively modest importance. The 
Constitution reverses this preference for the status quo in one significant 
 
 165. See Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll & Barry Weingast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive 
Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 16–19 (1994). 
 166. See NELSON W. POLSBY, HOW CONGRESS EVOLVES: SOCIAL BASES OF INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE 147–50 (2004). 
 167. That this form of countermajoritarianism has achieved quasi-constitutional status is 
demonstrated by the assurances of both Democratic and Republican majority leaders that their 
respective moves to eliminate the filibuster for appointments—not directly policy changes—would not 
affect the sixty-vote requirement for enacting new laws. See, e.g., Kelsey Snell, Senate Rewrites Rules to 
Speed Confirmations for Some Trump Nominees, NPR (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/
04/03/709489797/senate-rewrites-rules-to-speed-confirmations-for-some-trump-nominees [https:// 
perma.cc/6JBG-3TEL] (noting that Republicans’ 2019 removal of filibusters for appointments does 
not change rules regarding legislation); see also Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger ‘Nuclear’ Option; 
Eliminate Most Filibusters on Nominees, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-poised-to-limit-filibusters-in-party-line-vote-that-
would-alter-centuries-of-precedent/2013/11/21/d065cfe8-52b6-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html? 
noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/PS8G-6AEY (dark archive)] (noting that Democrats’ 2013 removal of 
filibusters for appointments also did not affect rules regarding legislation). 
 168. See JOHN P. BURKE, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THEORIES AND DILEMMAS 194–95 (2016) 
(suggesting that Presidents’ power to affect change decreases notably during their first term); see also 
VICTORIA A. FARRAR-MYERS, SCRIPTED FOR CHANGE: THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE 
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 165 (2007) (noting that institutional pressures, including staff and time 
constraints, typically restrict Presidents’ actions while in office).  
 169. About half of the states have part-time legislatures; several have legislatures that meet only 
biennially. See Full- and Part-Time Legislatures, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 14, 2017), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/full-and-part-time-legislatures.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/94FQ-NAZX]. Many states prohibit legislation encompassing more than one 
subject, require clear statements of that subject in a bill’s title, e.g., GA. CONST. art. III, § 5, para. 3, 
and enforce strict deadlines for bills to progress through each chamber during a legislative session, e.g., 
MD. CONST. art. III, § 27, pt. a. Some require various forms of public notice before bills may be 
considered, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 8, pt. b, and may require delaying their effective dates, e.g., id. 
art. IV, § 8, pt. c, paras. 1–2. 
 170. For example, some states require public hearings or the approval of a joint committee of the 
legislature before agencies may promulgate rules. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-4(a)(2) (2013) 
(requiring public hearings if requested by any government agency or at least twenty-five individuals); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-21.2(e) (2017) (requiring state agencies to hold hearings on proposed rules 
in response to any timely request by the public); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-110(A)(3) (2016) (mirroring 
Georgia’s public hearing requirement); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4005(C) (2017) (requiring agencies to 
submit biennial rules reports to a Joint Commission on Administrative Rules). 
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respect: requiring biennial appropriations for the armed forces.171 Congress has 
also reversed the presumption of continuation occasionally by including “sunset 
dates” in legislation.172 To date, however, this is a rarity and largely applied to 
appropriations acts and to statutes authorizing social programs. 
In theory, Presidents are not bound by their predecessors’ decisions (or 
even their own earlier choices) and can start with clean slates. In fact, they lack 
the decisional or political capacity to overturn more than a small fraction of the 
policies they inherit.173 Rarely has a President arrived so determined to sweep 
away his predecessor’s legacy as Donald Trump, yet many of his executive 
actions have been largely cosmetic,174 others have merely launched policy 
development processes that likely will take years to arrive at uncertain 
destinations,175 and some of those with immediate impact have been enjoined.176 
Presidents also inherit a bureaucracy staffed with those hired under the pre-
existing policy assumptions and likely to resist changes that seem imprudent or 
rushed.177 Thus, the formal and informal structures of government already 
impose substantial obstacles to elected officials’ ability to implement rapid 
policy changes just as acceptance of temporal equal protection would. 
b. Stare Decisis 
The doctrine of stare decisis is deeply stasis-reinforcing, not just requiring 
a changed majority on the Court, but also requiring that a majority believe that 
the prior decision was so severely wrong that reversing it justifies enduring 
criticism for departing from the judicial role.178 This presumption also likely 
discourages litigants from proposing changes in law and the Court from 
accepting many cases that ask it to consider doing so. More broadly, courts favor 
 
 171. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
 172. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2027(a)(1) (Supp. V 2017) (authorizing appropriations for the 
Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (“SNAP”), formerly food stamps, only through 
September 2018). 
 173. See BURKE, supra note 168, at 193–94, 231–32; see also FARRAR-MYERS, supra note 168, at 
165–66.  
 174. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,765, 82 Fed. Reg. 8351 (Jan. 24, 2017) (encouraging agencies to 
weaken health care law in anticipation of ACA repeal without making any concrete policy changes). 
 175. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,781, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,959 (Mar. 16, 2017) (directing the 
development of proposed plans that would then go through multiple levels of review). 
 176. Hawaii v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1237–39 (D. Haw.) (enjoining implementation of 
executive order restricting travel by citizens of predominately Muslim countries and curtailing refugee 
admissions) aff’d in part and vacated in part, 859 F.3d 741, vacated as moot and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 377 
(2017). 
 177. See Jon Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 540–
41 (2015) (describing career staff as the administrative equivalent of the judiciary, with secure tenure 
and a non-partisan commitment to the rule of law). 
 178. Compare Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 695–701 (1978) (finding limits on 
§ 1983 actions so indefensible as to justify overruling seventeen-year-old precedent), with id. at 714–17 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (decrying insufficient justification for disregarding stare decisis). 
98 N.C. L. REV. 59 (2019) 
98 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98 
granting injunctions preserving the status quo and impose heavier burdens on 
those seeking to impose change through judicial orders.179 
Although the Court lacks a formal mechanism for sunsetting its 
precedents, it has attempted to do so in a few cases with dubious results. In civil 
rights cases, it has suggested that longstanding bigotry will disappear and hence 
cause its precedents allowing remedial action to expire.180 The Court’s belief 
that it could limit its authorization of harsh racial discrimination to the duration 
of World War II may have contributed to its infamous decisions on the 
internment of Japanese Americans.181 And its embrace of an ad hoc version of 
equal protection that it warned was not to be precedent contributed to the scorn 
with which Bush v. Gore182 was received even among many conservatives.183 
The Court can, of course, devise ways to honor precedent nominally while 
taking the law in an entirely new direction.184 But the very fact of having a norm 
of continuation that receives public support across the political spectrum 
increases the costs to the Court of disturbing the status quo in more than modest 
ways. 
c. Federalism 
Although less clearly part of the original constitutional design to check 
majoritarian government,185 federalism has increasingly provided another set of 
checks on majoritarian rule at the federal level as public functions have become 
more complex and state and local participation becomes more crucial. The 
uncooperative federalism that Heather Gerken and Jessica Bulman-Pozen have 
described prevents the majorities at the federal level from effectuating broad 
legal change throughout the country if those majorities cannot bring along, or 
eventually wear down, state and local governments responding to different 
 
 179. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 439 U.S. 1358, 1359 (1978) (denying application 
for a stay). 
 180. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2628–29 (2013) (finding the Court’s decision 
upholding the Voting Rights Act’s pre-clearance requirement had ceased to be effective with the 
passing of several decades); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341–42 (2003) (insisting that 
affirmative action programs’ permissibility will “sunset”); Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. 
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247–48 (1991) (emphasizing that desegregation orders were intended to end). 
 181. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223–24 (1944) (upholding internment), abrogated 
by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 103–04 (1943) 
(upholding racial curfews). 
 182. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 183. See RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE 
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 180–81, 209, 217–18 (2001).  
 184. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–77 (1989) (limiting § 1981 to 
discrimination during the making, not the implementation, of a contract). 
 185. But see generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison) (comparing and contrasting traits 
of federalism and nationalism in the Constitution). 
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electorates.186 To be sure, state and local governments sometimes design new 
legal structures not sanctioned by their federal counterparts;187 the simplest, and 
thus most common, means of dissent is to continue operating a program in the 
same manner notwithstanding federal edicts that they change. 
Since the New Deal, the federal government has increasingly relied on 
states to administer its programs. Part of the reason is political, either to retain 
policy voices for the states on matters they long had managed or to reduce the 
visible footprint of federal authority. Part of the federal government’s reliance 
on states, however, is fiscal: states often are willing to pay some of the costs of 
programs they are allowed to administer, and in any event state and local civil 
servants are far cheaper than federal ones.188 The Supreme Court has gradually 
strengthened states’ hands in these arrangements, both prohibiting the federal 
government from mandating their participation189 and narrowing the scope of 
conditions that may be imposed on states wishing to participate.190 With 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,191 the Court gave states 
sweeping new powers to block important federal initiatives.192 In effect, the 
Court gave individual states a veto over changes in the Medicaid statute as 
applied to them, making them another vetogate through which many of the 
most important policy changes must pass.193 To win both enactment at the 
federal level and implementation in the states requires substantial 
supermajority support because political predispositions in the states vary so 
much from one another. 
d. Administrative Law 
Although administrative agencies arose in part as a means of achieving 
policy change at a volume that Congress could not produce, administrative law 
has developed into a powerful force for inhibiting legal change.194 Indeed, it has 
 
 186. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 
1265–71 (2009). 
 187. See id. at 1282 (discussing states’ flouting of federal drug law in legalizing marijuana). But see 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (inhibiting this practice by requiring congressional approval of interstate 
compacts). 
 188. David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2567 (2005) 
[hereinafter Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism]. 
 189. See generally, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (prohibiting the federal 
government from commandeering state officials). 
 190. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 209 (1987) (requiring conditions to be 
reasonably related to the purpose of the program). 
 191. 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
 192. Id. at 575–85, 588. 
 193. See id. 
 194. Although much of administrative law is nominally statutory rather than constitutional, as 
Eskridge and Ferejohn have noted, the Administrative Procedure Act has become firmly entrenched 
as a “super-statute” with quasi-constitutional status in our polity. ESKRIDGE JR. & FEREJOHN, supra 
note 143, at 77. 
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developed its own separation of powers, with political appointees, career civil 
servants, and civil society standing in for, respectively, the President, the 
judiciary, and Congress.195 This system can prevent a new majority from 
enacting policy changes. By making expertise a central criterion for agencies’ 
decisionmaking, administrative law effectively prevents actions that do not have 
both majoritarian support and some credibility in the expert community.196 And 
because expertise must be proven, and may be disputed, this requirement of 
administrative law increases the friction in the policymaking process, reducing 
the number of changes that may be attempted as well as the number that 
succeed. 
The administrative process imposes a temporal constraint on 
majoritarianism as well. If elections were immediate or continuous, elected 
officials would be fully accountable for the actions of their appointees. But 
because the appointees can operate at will for four years, either departing from 
their leader’s campaign promises or disregarding changes in public mood, 
administrative actions often reflect public sentiment some years before. Career 
civil servants, who may have been hired decades earlier, as well as life-tenured 
judges ruling on challenges to rules, represent even more of a “time capsule” of 
prior political preferences. With approval from several such persons commonly 
required,197 the effect is to limit policy changes to ones that have enjoyed 
majority or near-majority support for an extended period. 
The courts’ interpretations of the Administrative Procedure Act and 
related statutes also have the effect of entrenching existing policy against 
majoritarian desires for change that have arisen since the policy was enacted. 
Complying with the requirement of giving notice and seeking public comment 
on changes slows action down, potentially past the point that the new majority 
disintegrates. This is a form of supermajoritarianism, requiring majorities both 
at the time of initiating the policy change and some time later at the time of 
 
 195. Jon Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An Account of the Old and New 
Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227, 229 (2016). 
 196. In some environments, particularly independent agencies, majority support may not be 
needed at all. Id. at 284–85. More commonly, however, majoritarian officials determine which 
initiatives to advance. 
 197. Thus, for example, a change in regulations may require a policy analyst to write a notice of 
proposed rulemaking; clearance from several layers of supervisors and the agency’s legal counsel; a 
research specialist to prepare a cost-benefit analysis; sign-offs from civil rights, small business, and 
compliance experts; a budget analyst assessing any fiscal impact; review by at least one division of the 
Office of Management and Budget; consultation with other federal agencies; and then a repeat of the 
entire process after the policy analyst reviews all comments that the public submitted. At that point, 
adversely affected parties will sue in a district court they expect to be sympathetic to their concerns, 
with attorneys from the agency’s general counsel’s office and the Department of Justice having to 
defend the new regulation. If the plaintiffs picked their district wisely, they are likely to win, causing 
additional delay while the case proceeds to a circuit court. Should the President change at any point in 
this process, the entire effort may be aborted. 
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completing it. Indeed, the ready availability of judicial review means that, at 
least for important policies, the majority for change must be sustained for some 
years after the policy is approved to defend it in court. Given the frequency 
with which agencies fail to justify their actions to the standards courts impose, 
some significant number of policy changes that are indisputably within the 
powers of the agency will need a supportive administration several times: when 
they are initially proposed and finalized, when they are challenged in court, and 
when they are again proposed and finalized after having been found 
procedurally inadequate. 
In response to these limits and lags in agencies’ democratic responsiveness, 
administrative law has increased the friction of the policy-changing process to 
help constrain the vast power of the modern state. As the current President is 
discovering, perhaps to his irritation, officials must go through extensive 
processes of both internal and external review before changing policies. This is 
just as true when moving from an unregulated condition to the imposition of 
new constraints on private behavior as when eliminating such constraints—and 
the expectations of those who may have relied on the regulations.198 The burden 
of rulemaking also strains the resources of government to the point that a new 
majority may have to prioritize among its proposed changes, leaving in place 
many policies it rejects because the responsible agencies lack the staff time to 
prepare the notice of proposed rulemaking (including the numerous forms of 
analysis now required to be included in or with such notices199), analyze and 
respond to the public comments, and prepare a final rule—or other officials in 
the clearance chain lack the time to read and approve the proposed and final 
rules. This effectively entrenches many medium- and lower-priority policies 
that no longer enjoy majority support until their opponents have won enough 
successive elections to get around to changing them. 
The Court added to that burden when it required that any action to change 
existing policy explain why officials are rejecting the evidence and rationales 
that their predecessors had relied upon to enact that policy.200 Although the 
Court has cautioned that this does not mean that officials must show superior 
reasons supporting the new policy,201 new officials must still go through the 
same process to change a policy that their predecessors undertook to create it.202 
 
 198. The Administrative Procedure Act ever so slightly favors deregulation in allowing rules that 
lift burdens to become effective more rapidly than those imposing burdens, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012), 
but otherwise imposes the same requirements for making and terminating regulations, id. § 553(d). 
 199. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,083, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1999), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (Supp. IV 
1998); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2012); Exec. Order 
No. 12,857, 3 C.F.R. 623 (1994), reprinted in 2 U.S.C. § 900 (2000). 
 200. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41–44 (1983). 
 201. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. 502, 513–15 (2009). 
 202. Id. 
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Courts also favor continuity in the remedial orders they issue in 
administrative law cases. Even after finding a rule or order improperly 
promulgated, courts increasingly are remanding the matters to the issuing 
agencies for further proceedings without vacating the problematic enactment.203 
Some of this may reflect a view that defective regulation is better than none at 
all, but it also recognizes the disruptions and potential unfairness of changing 
legal regimes that have developed significant reliance interests. 
e. Procedural Due Process 
Although formally just a constraint on how rights are withdrawn rather 
than whether they are, in fact, procedural due process also makes many 
substantive policy changes cost-prohibitive for the administrative state. As such, 
it serves to entrench existing policies against the preferences of a changed 
political majority. 
Procedural due process only inhibits change, however, where the 
contemplated denials would require some individualized assessments. Thus, for 
example, if the state becomes convinced that many members of a particular 
profession are inept and untrustworthy, it could shut that profession down 
completely. If the profession and its sympathizers have sufficient influence to 
make that extreme route infeasible, the state may have to allow all practitioners 
to continue if it lacks the resources to build cases against individual 
incompetents, conduct the requisite hearings, and defend the inevitable appeals. 
By contrast, if the state wishes to reduce or abolish a particular entitlement 
uniformly, minimal process is required.204 Groups with substantial political 
power are likely to be able to prevent wholesale deprivations of their 
entitlements, and procedural due process effectively prevents widespread 
individual cullings; marginalized groups, on the other hand, derive less 
protection from procedural due process because it may be possible to eliminate 
their rights altogether. Much of the rhetoric surrounding both President 
Reagan’s cuts to low-income programs205 and the 1996 welfare law,206 for 
example, claimed that many unworthy recipients were mixed in with the “truly 
needy” and that sorting out who was whom within the existing structure was 
infeasible.207 
 
 203. Kristina Daugirdas, Note, Evaluating Remand Without Vacatur: A New Judicial Remedy for 
Defective Agency Rulemakings, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 278, 279–81 (2005). 
 204. See Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 128–29 (1985); Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915). 
 205. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97–35, 95 Stat. 357. 
 206. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–
193, 110 Stat. 2105. 
 207. Robert Pear, Reagan’s Social Impact; News Analysis, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 1982), 
https:/www.nytimes.com/1982/08/25/us/Reagan-s-social-impact-news-analysis.html 
[https:/perma.cc/8CNV-PYBD (dark archive)]. 
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f. Judicially Designed Rules of Construction 
Reaching beyond the constitutional and statutory limitations on legal 
change, courts have enunciated several rules that favor continuation of the 
existing order and impose heavy, supermajoritarian burdens on those seeking 
change. Although courts occasionally frame these doctrines as extensions of 
constitutional principles or interpretations of statutes, for the most part they 
represent courts’ sense that our legal order favors continuity. 
For example, courts have created a presumption against repeal of statutes 
by implication;208 instead, they presume that new statutes should be read in pare 
materia with older ones.209 This principle gains even more force when combined 
with the often contrafactual assumption that the legislature is aware of the 
current state of the law.210 When courts follow this approach, they privilege old, 
sometimes obscure, statutes over the most recent expression of majority 
sentiment.211 To be sure, the best practice is to do a thorough canvass of the 
existing state of the law before legislating, but the pressures of time, limited 
staff, and human frailty will often preclude that.212 An interpretive regime under 
which some substantial fraction of duly passed statutes fails to have full effect 
will require proponents of the change to achieve sufficiently supermajoritarian 
support to enact it twice. 
Similarly, courts construe statutes to displace the common law to the most 
limited degree possible.213 Thus, legislators must draft statutes disturbing the 
existing legal order more clearly than other legislation or expect it to have less 
impact.214 Here again, because drafting errors and unforeseen circumstances are 
practically inevitable, this means that legislatures often will have to enact two 
or more statutes to impose a change in the legal order where only a single statute 
might suffice, with more generous judicial construction, in addressing a new 
problem. 
As a group, these rules do not have a clear pro- or anti-regulatory bias: the 
rule against repeals by implication tends to preserve regulation, but the rule 
 
 208. Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003). 
 209. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974) (harmonizing legislation assisting 
Native Americans with civil rights laws prohibiting employment discrimination). 
 210. Compare, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 38–45 (1983) (interpreting the Civil Rights Act 
of 1871 § 1, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in light of tort cases of that era), with id. at 92–93 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (finding it improbable that Congress had a clear understanding of the relevant common law 
given the significant split in authority that existed). 
 211. To be sure, another maxim favors more recent enactments over older ones. As the Legal 
Realists pointed out, many canons of statutory construction have at least partial opposites, with courts 
sometimes selecting among them ad hoc. 
 212. Only ten states have full-time legislatures with substantial, professionally paid staffs. Full- 
and Part-Time Legislatures, supra note 169.  
 213. Shaw v. R.R. Co., 101 U.S. 557, 565 (1879). 
 214. Id. 
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strictly construing statutes in derogation of the common law does the opposite. 
But both tend to increase the burdens on those that would seek to change 
current law, causing some with clear majority support to fail. 
g. Exceptional Supermajoritarianism 
Article V establishes a strict, highly supermajoritarian procedure for 
changing some of our most important legal rules. Even where a solid majority 
desires change—as, for example, was clearly the case with the Equal Rights 
Amendment in the 1970s215 and may be true of term limits today216—Article V 
preserves the minority’s right to preserve the existing constitutional regime. 
In two important respects, Article V rejects majoritarianism altogether. It 
prohibits amendments that would deny each state equal representation in the 
Senate or that would curtail the slave trade prior to 1808. In both these respects, 
the Framers concluded that states’ expectations of the continuation of their 
current legal status—as having equal status in the new Republic and as being 
able to increase their access to cheap involuntary labor to fuel their economic 
growth—were too fundamental even for a supermajority to abridge. 
Bruce Ackerman,217 William Eskridge, and John Ferejohn218 have made a 
compelling case that the twentieth century saw a new form of constitutional 
change arise outside of Article V.219 Although their formulations of this popular 
constitutionalism differ, they each involve a time-consuming process in which 
proponents of constitutional change must navigate the routine 
supermajoritarian mechanisms several times.220 The proponents must, among 
other things, win several successive national elections and so entrench their 
proposed constitutional commitments that most of their opponents abandon the 
fight. 
Even the crass realist account of constitutional change that focuses on the 
Supreme Court’s makeup requires a faction seeking change to win several 
successive presidential elections and—with the Senate’s new willingness to 
 
 215. See Bridget L. Murphy, The Equal Rights Amendment Revisited, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 937, 
940–41 (2018).  
 216. See Tal Axelrod, GOP Senators Propose Congressional Term Limits, HILL (May 14, 2019), 
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[https://perma.cc/GM5S-UKTP].  
 217. Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1742–47 (2007). 
 218. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, supra note 143, at 25–26. 
 219. For an example of how these doctrines might work in real time, see David A. Super, The 
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refuse even to consider nominees of the opposing party221—to prevail in several 
congressional elections at the same time. As Presidents increasingly appoint 
relatively young justices, and justices refuse to step down under Presidents of 
the party with which they most disagree, the number of elections that must be 
won to reshape the Court has increased. Individual justices may surprise on 
particular issues, but to achieve broad change in the constitutional regime, far, 
far more than fleeting majority preferences are required. Some have argued that 
the Supreme Court functions as a living time capsule, privileging political 
attitudes from the past over those of the current political environment.222 
The effect then is both to favor continuation of prior individual policies 
and to entrench whole regimes because of the effort required to address each 
policy even when a supermajority favors change. This means that a great many 
important statutes remain in force despite being enacted by legislatures chosen 
through far more limited suffrage than we now deem democratically necessary. 
Even those laws that have changed often had to be negotiated with defenders 
of the old order who could extract concessions out of proportion to their 
numbers because of the difficulty of changing law. Thus, these stasis-reinforcing 
doctrines systematically privilege the preferences of those that held power 
through deprivations of basic democratic rights. Obviously wiping old laws off 
the books en masse would create chaos that serves nobody’s interests, but our 
system’s entrenchment of the status quo should not be understood to be either 
value-neutral or even consistent with majoritarian democracy; it is serving other 
purposes that are deemed more important. 
2.  Doctrines Limiting the Means of Changing Policy 
Although most substantive constitutional principles constrain the content 
of public policy, a handful specifically constrain the act of changing rules.223 
They do not affect what the law and the allocation of rights may be. Instead, 
they limit how the government may implement a given rule. When the methods 
these principles proscribe are the only practically or politically feasible means 
of changing policy, they have the effect of locking in prior policies without 
regard to the current majority’s wishes. 
 
 221. See, e.g., Carl Hulse, Democrats, with Garland on Mind, Mobilize for Supreme Court Fight, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/24/us/politics/donald-trump-supreme-
court-democrats.html [https://perma.cc/W2H5-62E8 (dark archive)]. 
 222. Thus, for example, the Court included at least one moderate Republican until 2010, decades 
after the Reagan Revolution marginalized them in national and most state politics. Adam Liptak, 
Conservatives in Charge, the Supreme Court Moved Right, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2018), 
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id. art. V. 
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a. The Takings Clause 
The Court has, for the most part, avoided declaring that the government 
must establish rules recognizing any particular kind of property rights,224 but 
once it does so it may not change those rules to eliminate protected property 
rights. Although much of the controversy surrounding takings in recent years 
has concerned the definition of a “public purpose” for which government may 
invoke its eminent domain powers,225 the core of the Takings Clause is a 
prohibition on forcing a minority to finance public functions. As such, it is 
strongly countermajoritarian: the electorate will routinely prefer impositions on 
a few wealthy individuals to paying for services with broad-based taxes. In 
contrast to the Court’s reluctance to recognize poverty as a suspect classification 
in its cross-sectional equal protection jurisprudence,226 the protected class here 
is very much defined by its wealth. Takings law avoids the definitional problems 
that the Court cited as a barrier to considering wealth in cross-sectional equal 
protection: the protected class consists of those against whom the state is acting. 
In addition, takings jurisprudence has escaped the principle that greater 
powers encompass lesser ones. This principle has proven a formidable barrier 
to asserting other constitutional protections of individual rights. When the state 
would be free to impose a more drastic loss, the Court generally has had little 
sympathy for those challenging lesser harms.227 Yet the Court’s exaction cases 
involved permits that the state would have been free to deny outright, with the 
Court nonetheless striking down the lesser burden of conditionally granting 
those permits.228 In essence, the Court has found that the manner of exercising 
power, as well as the sheer scope of the intervention, merits constitutional 
scrutiny. Notably, takings law also embraces a temporal perspective, even 
proscribing transitory uncompensated impositions on property rights.229 
 
 224. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538–39 (1985) (declaring that 
the definition of property rights for due process purposes is a matter of state law). 
 225. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 469–75 (2005) (allowing taking of homes in 
healthy neighborhood to facilitate private company’s expansion); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32–
33 (1954) (allowing taking of well-maintained building in impoverished neighborhood for urban 
renewal). 
 226. See generally, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (noting that 
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Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 825 (1987). 
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Even after the Court came to recognize many administrative dispensations 
as property for purposes of the Due Process Clauses, it has continued to refuse 
to treat them as property for takings purposes.230 
b. The Contracts Clause 
Similarly, while the government is free to prohibit the formation of new 
contracts, it is constrained on how it may interfere with existing ones.231 Here 
again, the election of a new majority that believes that certain kinds of 
previously legal contracts are pernicious does not allow that majority to rid itself 
of those contracts. Although the Contracts Clause also limits the state’s ability 
to rewrite existing private contracts, a key aspect of it is the prohibition on the 
state using sovereign powers to lighten the burden of its own contracts with 
private entities. The purpose here is similar to that of the Takings Clause: to 
prevent the state from shifting the burden of its activities onto a narrow set of 
private parties (here, those that have contracted with the state). The Court has 
broadened this protection of contractual rights to situations where the private 
parties do not face any clear financial loss.232 
The Contracts Clause also inhibits the state from substituting regulatory 
distributions between private parties for public expenditures financed by 
taxation. Here again, the concern is with making a small group of politically 
weak people—those whose contractual rights are being impaired—shoulder the 
burden of financing a public agenda. The Court has allowed some departures 
from this principle in emergency conditions,233 but has rejected what it regarded 
as efforts to exploit emergencies to shift major public burdens onto a private 
minority with contractual impairments.234 
Contracts concluded by one administration therefore will bind and 
constrain its successor.235 They thus become an alternative form of legislation 
and one that is likely harder to change. 
As in the case of takings, the Contracts Clause’s protected class is an 
economic one: those with sufficient wealth to have contractual rights the state 
wishes to disrupt. Definitions here, too, pose little problem because the class is 
defined by the actions the state takes against it. 
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c. Bills of Attainder, Ex Post Facto Laws, and Limits on Retroactive 
Legislation 
Although the constitutional prohibitions on bills of attainder and ex post 
facto laws236 only nominally constrain the timing and generality of legislation 
rather than its content, their effect is to further entrench the existing legal 
regime. These rules make existing policy irrevocable as it is applied to current 
events to the extent that it benefits non-governmental actors.237 Where a process 
is ongoing and political or equitable considerations prevent treating later 
participants differently from earlier ones, and if Congress—slowed by 
bicameralism, presentment, and a crushing workload that exceeds its current 
capacity—cannot legislate before the first participant acts, the legislature may 
have little choice but to continue the old regime for all involved. 
The Court also has applied presumptions against retroactive legislation—
as well as specific constitutional prohibitions on certain kinds of laws—to 
prevent current majorities from attempting to extend their temporal reach 
backwards.238 
Even in the realm of civil litigation, the Court’s qualified immunity 
doctrine has entrenched existing legal regimes against changes—even those the 
Court itself has undertaken. Officials misusing their positions to oppress those 
under their power are only civilly liable if it was objectively clear at the time 
they acted that the law proscribed their actions.239 Thus, superseded or rejected 
legal rules continue to operate until a new regime not only comes onto the scene 
but makes itself sufficiently obvious. 
The Court’s rules discouraging retroactive legislation reinforce stasis even 
more strongly. Unless Congress not only sets an effective date but also specifies 
that it wants its enactment to apply retroactively,240 the Court will reject 
retroactive effect even at the cost of frustrating much of the congressional 
purpose.241 Here again, this constraint interacts with other change-inhibiting 
rules: if the administrative agency charged with implementing a statute fails to 
promulgate rules on time, or does so in a manner courts find defective, the old 
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regime is preserved for the period affected even if all affected parties had notice 
of the change and of its intended effective date.242 
Notably, justification plays little role in these rules’ application. The ban 
on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws is absolute, not waivable even for 
strong policy purposes.243 And the requirement that Congress explicitly 
provides for retroactive effect does not vary depending on the strength of the 
congressional purpose or the reason action could not be taken in advance of the 
preferred deadline. 
d. Reliance Interests 
Although the extent to which judicial enforcement might be available is 
unclear,244 deeply entrenched norms hold that the state may not disturb certain 
kinds of clearly delineated reliance interests even if the current majority finds 
them improvident. For example, once income has been taxed, it may not be 
taxed again by the same tax system.245 This is true even if the recipient had the 
opportunity to pay taxes at a dramatically reduced rate. Thus, various tax cuts 
championed by President Reagan, Speaker Gingrich, and Speaker Ryan have 
been designed specifically to increase revenues in early years by allowing 
prepayment of taxes at bargain rates (with those revenues being used to offset 
other tax cuts of a more conventional decline).246 Even the harshest critics of 
these tax cuts have not seriously argued that that income could be subjected to 
further taxation to reclaim the government’s revenue losses. These tax measures 
thus confer the equivalent of a property status—having income that is regarded 
as having been taxed—on the affluent taxpayers in question. The result is to 
lock in the tax status of income beyond the effective power of future legislators 
to change. 
3.  Facially Neutral Doctrines Entrenching Tradition 
The entire enterprise of judicial review is fundamentally anti-majoritarian. 
And because the Court will rarely attempt to rewrite a statute or regulation that 
it finds wanting,247 the result of judicial criticism is that the elected branches 
commonly must surmount the supermajoritarian requirements of their various 
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vetogates multiple times to enact the substantively unobjectionable part of an 
initiative. Beyond that, however, the Court has interpreted several 
constitutional principles in ways that inhibit policy changes more than they 
restrain entrenched policies that arguably have similar impacts. More generally, 
the Court’s increasing emphasis on originalism tends to skew its interpretations 
in favor of policy stasis. 
a. Stasis-Reinforcing Interpretations of Facially Neutral Rules 
Although the First Amendment is facially neutral between new and old 
violations of its edicts, the Court’s application of it has relied heavily upon 
tradition. The Court is far more likely to find a violation of the Establishment 
Clause when Congress or a state adopts a new policy favoring a particular 
religion248 than when they continue existing preferences.249 Thus, the Court has 
treated the status quo as creating vested rights in both champions and 
opponents of state favoritism for religion. 
The Court also has protected the continuation of existing means of 
expression250 far more energetically than it has comparably important but new 
opportunities for expression.251 And it has privileged expression through 
longstanding media252 over that through new forms of communication that lack 
comparable arguments from tradition.253 Although the Court has been willing 
to upend longstanding restrictions on expression, it has built a regime that 
strongly skews in favor of the status quo. 
Similarly, although some prominent descriptions of procedural due 
process speak in atemporal utilitarian terms,254 the Court often has framed the 
requirements of procedural due process in terms of preserving longstanding 
 
 248. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244–47 (1982) (striking down registration 
requirement for religious groups soliciting donations); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 398 (1963) 
(disallowing discrimination against persons observing a Saturday Sabbath in a relatively new social 
welfare program). 
 249. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 668–70 (1984) (upholding nativity display because 
those have long been accepted); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 783–84 (1983) (upholding state-
paid legislative chaplains based on their long history in this country). 
 250. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 501–02 (1946) (allowing literature distribution in 
downtown area notwithstanding its private ownership). 
 251. See, e.g., Lee v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. 830, 830–31 (1992) (per 
curiam) (denying right to distribute information in airports). 
 252. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2218–22 (2015) (limiting municipal 
regulation of signage); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 377–78 (1992) (striking down ordinance 
against placing hate-inspiring objects on public or private property). 
 253. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 726–28 (1978) (upholding prohibition of 
nonobscene material over broadcast media). 
 254. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (establishing a three-part 
balancing test). 
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practices and rules.255 And even when applying its utilitarian formula, the Court 
at times will disregard a balance that it finds pointing in one way to preserve 
historical settlements of issues.256 Thus, new procedural rules are far more likely 
to be struck down than those entrenched in the status quo.257 The same is often 
true in criminal procedure. Longstanding practices are likely to be sustained, 
even with paltry justification.258 New kinds of intrusions are more likely to 
receive intensive analysis.259 
Takings jurisprudence also is deeply stasis reinforcing. The Court has 
allowed the state to regulate property aggressively, even destroying the lion’s 
share of its value, if the restrictions are similar to those entrenched in 
longstanding common law260 or legislation.261 
b. Originalist Constitutional and Statutory Construction 
The process of considering the original public meaning of constitutional 
and statutory provisions262 is deeply stasis reinforcing. It forces advocates of 
change to demonstrate supermajoritarian support anew, even if the purpose or 
language of the prior statute would justify adapting its application to deal with 
a new problem. It also tends to privilege stasis by forcing constitutional or 
statutory drafters to write with exceptional clarity, and foresight, to avoid 
having their enactments read minimally. Thus, originalists commonly will seize 
on one concept of a provision to discredit arguments that it served others as 
 
 255. See, e.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (describing due process as 
protecting “principle[s] of justice . . . rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people”); Twining 
v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101 (1908) (finding that due process prohibits “change in ancient procedure” 
that impairs fundamental principles). 
 256. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 18–19 (1981) (finding historical 
reluctance to require appointive counsel where incarceration was not threatened overrode results of 
balancing). 
 257. See, e.g., id. To be sure, in the modern administrative state, all procedures are relatively new. 
 258. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 318–20 (2001) (upholding arrest of 
motorist for minor offense not punishable by jail time). 
 259. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 27–28, 34–35 (2001) (finding use of thermal 
imaging an unlawful search). 
 260. Compare, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 396–97 (1926) (upholding 
zoning that destroyed three-quarters of property’s value because zoning addresses incompatible land 
uses in a manner broadly analogous to nuisance), with Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 419–20 (1982) (finding a taking in requirement that landlords accept cable 
television boxes and wires on their property because the intrusion was similar to a common law 
trespass). 
 261. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155–57 (1921). 
 262. See generally Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 101 (2001) (explaining that, under originalism, constitutional and statutory provisions are 
interpreted by considering both the original intent of the authors as well as the original meaning a 
reasonable English speaker would have attributed at the time). 
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well.263 In constitutional adjudication, this tends to confine the body of 
enforceable rights to those well-established in history and presumably largely 
reflected in the status quo.264 The result is to buttress even “uncommonly silly” 
laws.265 
B. Unifying Themes in Stasis-Reinforcing Doctrines 
Several important themes unite the stasis-reinforcing doctrines described 
in the last section. These can provide important guidance about the contours of 
temporal equal protection because they show what the courts already are, and 
are not, prepared to do to deny current majorities the right to change current 
law. These themes differ markedly from some of the long-accepted limitations 
on cross-sectional equal protection’s interference with majorities’ ability to 
enact classifications. Section III.B.1 identifies several norms that unite many of 
these doctrines. Section III.B.2 considers the analytical methods on which 
courts rely in weighing invocations of these doctrines. Finally, Section III.B.3 
contrasts these doctrines theoretical justifications with those that have 
dominated debates about the countermajoritarian difficulty with cross-sectional 
equal protection. 
1.  Normative Themes 
Existing doctrines that promote stasis share many of the same values. For 
convenience, these may be grouped into six categories, some of which are 
related: preventing state power from being used for economic exploitation, 
preventing the cost of government from being shifted to a few individuals rather 
than the general tax base, blocking harsh measures motivated by hatred, 
preventing the government from acting hastily, preserving reliance interests in 
settled social arrangements, and minimizing the costs of transitions. 
a. Preventing Oppression 
A primary purpose of inhibiting policy change is to prevent the majority 
from solving its perceived problems through exploitation of an overpowered 
minority. This is obviously the point of the Takings and Contracts Clauses. Far 
less admirably, it was also the point of the Constitution’s provisions requiring 
free states’ cooperation in apprehending fugitive slaves and prohibiting 
restrictions on the slave trade prior to 1808. More subtly, it also underlies 
procedural due process and requirements of public notice and an opportunity 
to comment prior to the issuance of most administrative rules: those wishing to 
 
 263. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Whence Comes Section One? The Abolitionist Origins of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101, 165 (2011). 
 264. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 588 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 265. Id. at 605 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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wield state power to redistribute others’ wealth must first bear both the burden, 
in staff time and delay, of a proceeding and risk public embarrassment if they 
cannot justify their actions.266 Madison and others also believed that the 
separation of powers, and the arduous process of enacting legislation, would 
derail populist efforts at redistribution.267 
Crucially, most of these doctrines do not depend upon showing an intent 
to oppress. They exist in part because of a recognition that state machinery 
often is captured for oppressive purposes, but these doctrines do not assume 
that oppressive intent can be recognized in particular cases. They also do not 
attempt to define which minorities are most likely to be oppressed. Instead, 
they restrict the types of policy changes that seem best-suited to oppressive uses 
against whomever is politically vulnerable at a given time. 
Limiting important public policies to those initially in position to benefit 
reduces the costs of those policies at the expense of those that could benefit 
later. This allows a dominant group to redistribute wealth to its members 
without concern that those policies will later redistribute away from them. 
b. Avoiding Disproportionate Burdens 
Closely related, these rules seek to avoid shifting the costs of government 
that benefit the public at large to a few individuals. This is certainly the core 
rationale for the Takings and Contracts Clauses.268 It also means that when the 
elected legislature or administration fails to finish the work of lawmaking by 
the desired date, the costs of that failure may not be shifted onto those subject 
to the new rules with retroactive legislation. Procedural due process, too, limits 
the State’s ability to support itself through exploitative or unfounded actions 
against individuals.269 
 
 266. But see Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 467 (1983) (first citing FPC v. Texaco Inc., 337 
U.S. 33, 41–44 (1964); and then citing United States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956)) 
(allowing administrative agencies to create rules foreclosing issues in hearings); Weinberger v. Salfi, 
422 U.S. 749, 784–85 (1975) (allowing legislatures to conclusively presume facts and deny individuals 
the chance to show otherwise in an administrative hearing context). 
 267. See generally, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO 51 (James Madison) . 
 268. Cf. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 237, 239–40 (2003) (quoting Wash. Legal 
Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., 271 F.3d 835, 861–62 (9th Cir. 2001)) (emphasizing that interest on 
lawyers’ trust accounts had no practical value to clients in upholding their transfer to fund legal services 
for low-income people). 
 269. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578–79 (1973) (quoting KENNETH C. DAVIS, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 12.04, at 250 (1972)) (prohibiting officials responsible for 
municipal budgets from imposing fines); Barry v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1324, 1327, 1330–31 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(finding no substantial justification in government’s defense of system that more closely scrutinized 
adjudicators with higher rates of allowing disability claims), overruled on other grounds by Mt. Graham 
Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1462 (9th Cir. 1992), and Lu v. United States, 921 F.3d 850, 
862 (9th Cir. 2019). 
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The federal government’s sources of funding have changed dramatically 
since its founding, but the Framers’ opposition to placing the burden of 
resolving its fiscal problems on a relatively small number of people clearly 
remains relevant. And this works without any substantive rules about what 
constitutes sufficiently broad sharing of burdens. 
Here again, applying burdensome policies only when members of 
disfavored groups are subject to them makes a politically marginalized group 
bear society’s general costs. Conversely, denying newly advancing groups the 
benefit of positive policies artificially lowers their cost, again at the cost of a 
disfavored fraction of the population rather than society as a whole. 
c. Frustrating Malicious Legal Change 
These doctrines also seek to defeat malicious changes in legal rules. Bills 
of attainder—legislatively declaring someone guilty of a crime based on their 
previous conduct—are the most obvious example of this, but procedural due 
process more generally limits officials’ ability to act vengefully against those 
under their power. Administrative law’s reason-giving requirements are not 
absolute protection against well-crafted pretexts, but they can trip up those 
whose hatred has overpowered their capacity for reason. The Takings Clause 
similarly deprives officials of the ability to ruin their enemies under the guise 
of a laudable public purpose.270 The Free Exercise Clause scrutinizes new 
restrictions more closely in part because of the long history of entrenched 
religious groups oppressing newcomers. 
Here again, these doctrines do not promise absolute immunity from 
malign legislation. They do, however, reflect the Framers’ belief that the 
machinery of the state is constantly at risk of being commandeered for personal 
and factional agendas contrary to the public interest and oppressive to some. 
Partially depleting the arsenal available to those usurpers is a valuable, if 
incomplete, response. Extending equal protection scrutiny to temporal 
inequalities would further that agenda. 
d. Requiring More Careful Consideration of Policy Changes 
Stasis-preserving doctrines also seek to prevent hasty, ill-considered 
actions. The requirement of state reasons found in procedural due process,271 in 
 
 270. But see ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW 
YORK 877 (1974) (describing changes in highway routes to destroy political enemies or spare friends). 
 271. See, e.g., Dilda v. Quern, 612 F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 1980) (first citing Vargas v. Trainor, 
508 F.2d 485, 489 (7th Cir. 1974); and then citing Banks v. Trainor, 525 F.2d 837, 842 (7th Cir. 1975)) 
(describing content required in notices terminating assistance to low-income families). 
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notice-and-comment rulemaking,272 and in arbitrary-and-capricious review273 
will be difficult for an excited mob to meet. Hasty legislators will forget to 
provide the plain statement required to override the common law274 or to 
include amendments to existing statutes that potentially conflict with their 
bills.275 The Framers repeatedly emphasized that bicameralism—which requires 
approval in a Senate with terms staggered over a six-year period—and other 
explicit and implicit requirements of supermajorities empower a cautious 
minority not swept up in a passing frenzy. Article V’s time-consuming process 
for amending the Constitution is the ultimate example of a deliberation-forcing 
rule and has indeed resulted in several proposals failing when their appeal 
ebbed. 
By focusing on the process of reasoned decisionmaking, rather than the 
merits of the policies themselves, courts enforcing these rules can avoid 
substituting their policy judgment for that of the elected branches yet still 
improve the quality of decisionmaking. The great bulk of the impact here is 
deterrence: awareness that courts could intervene if policymakers fail to give 
adequate reasons or attempt to bypass a step in the process where reasons are 
required. Even zealous advocates of change recognize the need to slow down 
enough to articulate reasons. And the process of articulating reasons commonly 
forces advocates to recognize that some extreme aspects of their proposals are 
indefensible and must be dropped. 
Applying equal protection scrutiny temporally would compel 
policymakers to craft nondiscriminatory explanations for the shifts. The history 
of superficially plausible excuses for cross-sectional discrimination certainly 
suggests that those bent on discrimination can do so, but having to do so might 
cause delays and divisions within the dominant coalition, causing some 
discriminatory initiatives to fall short. 
e. Recognizing Reliance Interests 
Almost all of these doctrines seek to protect settled social and economic 
expectations. The Takings and Contracts Clauses ensure that those that have 
ordered their affairs on the assumption that they have certain property or 
 
 272. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012). 
 273. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–43 
(1983) (citing Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)) (requiring 
agency to explain why it is departing from its prior analysis of the scientific evidence before changing 
policy). 
 274. See, e.g., Oswin v. Shaw, 609 A.2d 415, 425 (N.J. 1992) (requiring statutes in derogation of 
the common law to be narrowly construed), superseded by Act of May 19, 1998, ch. 21, sec. 11, § 8, 1998 
N.J. Laws 144, 160–62 (codified as amended at N.J. REV. STAT. § 39:6A-8 (2013)), as recognized in 
Davidson v. Slater, 914 A.2d 282, 289–91 (N.J. 2007). 
 275. See, e.g., Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003) (finding inconsistencies between sections 
of federal elections statutes). 
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contractual rights will not have their plans upended. The prohibition on some 
forms of retroactive legislation and strong presumptions against others reflects 
the expectation that people will learn, and order their affairs around, the law. 
The prohibition on legislation or even constitutional amendments interfering 
with the slave trade for two decades honored perceived reliance interests by 
slaveholders who anticipated a steady stream of involuntary labor to support 
their investment in farmland. 
Even where the Court will not fully protect reliance interests, it often 
seeks to discourage changes that are likely to disrupt those interests, such as 
building one’s plans around common law rules or prior legislation. Notice-and-
comment procedures, and the typically drawn-out process of legislating with 
bicameralism and presentment, provide an opportunity to make policymakers 
aware of reliance interests. Explicit and implicit supermajority requirements, 
and procedural due process, give those with reliance interests various officials 
whom they can effectively ask for relief. 
The Court has repeatedly declined to recognize a broad principle of 
protecting generic reliance interests created by either Congress276 or executive 
officials.277 These doctrines, however, suggest that reliance interests merit 
respect in many contexts, if not across the board. 
Temporal equal protection can play a particularly important role in 
protecting reliance interests. Many people may work hard to put themselves in 
position to benefit from current policies. Families may sacrifice to buy a home 
in a community with well-funded schools or encourage their children to work 
for good grades required to qualify for admission to state universities. 
Subsequently foreclosing the opportunities that families worked hard to access 
will be deeply demoralizing. 
f. Minimizing Transition Costs 
Finally, and relatedly, some of these doctrines seek to minimize the costs 
of transitions from one legal regime to another. Rules prohibiting some kinds 
of retroactive legislation and establishing rules of construction to discourage 
others avoid the most wrenching, disruptive turnarounds. Notice-and-comment 
rulemaking provides warning of changes as well as the opportunity to request 
accommodations during the transition; the time required for traversing 
bicameralism and presentment and to negotiate arrangements with state and 
 
 276. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960) (allowing Congress to revoke Social 
Security eligibility after it already had been earned). 
 277. See, e.g., Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 426–27, 430 (1990) (rejecting 
reliance claim by former federal worker misadvised about his eligibility for benefits by government 
benefits specialist); Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 786, 788, 790 (1981) (refusing to afford 
retroactive treatment to eventual application of claimant discouraged from applying by Social Security 
representative). 
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local governments, as well as the advance notice rules in state constitutions, can 
perform similar functions. The need to formulate reasons, and aversion to losing 
an entire rulemaking if a reviewing court finds its disregard of reliance interests 
arbitrary and capricious, likely pushes agencies to be less radical in the changes 
they make through rulemaking.278 
This fits well with the Framers’ oft-repeated belief that fluidity in the laws 
was contrary to the public interest, regardless of the content of the old and new 
rules.279 The legal ideology of their period offered little room for changes in 
private law. It also militated against changing public law rules thought to reflect 
an enduring natural order of the world. Many no doubt accepted this view 
sincerely; for others, the necessity of couching changes in the common law as 
interpretations of prior doctrine or corrections of discrete errors kept them 
modest enough to keep transition costs moderate. 
If application of temporal equal protection discourages policymakers from 
making discriminatory policy changes, a side benefit will be reduced transition 
costs. 
2.  Analytic Methods 
The methods of these stasis-entrenching rules have much in common with 
one another while differing notably from those on which cross-sectional equal 
protection has relied. First, purpose or intent to violate these rules often is 
irrelevant. The reason a bill could not achieve cloture in the Senate is 
immaterial; it cannot change law. Whether states were wise to decline the 
Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion—under which the federal 
government paid all costs for three years and at least ninety percent thereafter—
does not matter.280 Agencies’ failures to provide adequate reasons often result 
from inadvertence, but they still suffice to have their actions struck down.281 
Second, in marked contrast to cross-sectional equal protection analysis’s 
insensitivity to classifications involving wealth or income, these temporal 
doctrines quite explicitly operate against economic-based harms. Takings and 
Contract Clause jurisprudence in particular will entertain the notion of 
economic classes capturing the machinery of government to oppress other 
classes. Although the Court substantially broadened standing during the 1960s 
 
 278. See also Eder v. Beal, 609 F.2d 695, 697, 699–701 (3d Cir. 1979) (requiring advance notice to 
recipients so that they may reorder their affairs before discontinuing a Medicaid service). 
 279. See supra text accompanying notes 162–164. 
 280. See Mark Hall, Do States Regret Expanding Medicaid?, BROOKINGS, 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/usc-brookings-schaeffer-on-health-policy/2018/03/26/do-states-
regret-expanding-medicaid/ [https://perma.cc/VRH8-P5JX]. 
 281. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 93–95 (1943) (prohibiting agencies from raising 
arguments on review that they neglected to include as the original rationale for an administrative 
determination). 
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and 1970s,282 economic loss remains important to obtaining judicial review in 
administrative law.283 
Third, these doctrines, unlike cross-sectional equal protection, do not shy 
away from asking the courts to engage in complex economic analysis. They can 
rely on formalistic rules to simplify the questions presented, but those rules 
generally do not purport to address all cases. For example, although physical 
intrusions are treated as takings per se,284 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon285 
requires courts to make the very kind of subjective determination—about how 
much regulation is “too much”—that modern cross-sectional equal protection 
doctrine is designed to preclude.286 The Court has cabined these doctrines by 
applying them only to serious impositions, but that approach, too, requires 
subjective judgments.287 
Fourth, these doctrines are not limited to extreme situations. They do not 
license judicial intervention over trifles, but neither do they require existential 
threats to democracy or attacks on the most marginalized members of society. 
In our legal culture, they have been integrated into our understanding of how 
our government works rather than being regarded as anomalous affronts to 
democratic government. 
Finally, and relatedly, they involve comparing two legal regimes that both 
have considerable legitimacy: one established by the current leadership and one 
that either was selected by its predecessors or that has been present for an 
extended time.288 By contrast, successful cross-sectional equal protection 
challenges often lead to contentious questions of remedy, with the legitimacy 
of any judicial resolution contested. 
All of this suggests that change-inhibiting doctrines have allowed courts 
to engage in far more realistic analyses of the problems presented to them than 
change-forcing doctrines.289 They cast courts into roles still different from, but 
 
 282. See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 
412 U.S. 669, 686 (1973) (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972)) (allowing standing 
based on aesthetic interests). 
 283. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102–03, 105, 109 (1998) 
(rejecting standing where site of environmental harm could not be predicted); Lujan v. Defs. of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562–64 (1992) (requiring relatively certain and immediate harms for standing). 
 284. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982). 
 285. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 286. Id. at 413; see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36–37 (1973) (declining 
to assess the degree of deprivation suffered by lower-income school districts). But see Edgewood Indep. 
Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989) (finding the same school finance system 
inconsistent with the Texas Constitution). 
 287. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978) (quoting Pa. Coal Co., 
260 U.S. at 413). 
 288. Procedural limitations on governmental action leave in place the prior order—which may be 
earlier legislation or regulations, the common law, or an unregulated environment. Enforcement of the 
Takings and Contracts Clauses typically leave the prior arrangement of rights undisturbed. 
 289. See supra Section I.C.  
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more harmonious with, officials in the other branches and hence permit a 
greater degree of intervention. 
3.  Theoretical Justifications 
The theoretical rationales for these diverse doctrines predictably vary, yet 
most fall into a few classes. 
Many seek to inhibit policies with concentrated costs and widely 
distributed benefits.290 These sorts of policies hold the greatest risk of 
oppression. Thus, the extensive procedures required to make policy give the 
potential victims of oppressive policies multiple opportunities to frustrate the 
benefiting majority. If the would-be oppressors try to evade scrutiny with 
opaque language, they may run afoul of interpretive presumptions of 
continuity. And if the oppression is too intense, the Takings, Contract, and Due 
Process Clauses may derail it. 
The opposite type of policy, with widely distributed costs and 
concentrated benefits, raises more of a risk of corruption, which the Court 
generally has said does not, by itself, warrant close constitutional scrutiny.291 
Administrative law, however, and some aspects of legislative procedure, require 
some delays and transparency to inhibit corrupt changes. But the Court seems 
to believe that the chance the political process will resolve collective action 
problems to root out corruption likely are greater than that it will overcome 
both self-interest and collective action problems to alleviate profitable burdens 
it has imposed on isolated members of society.292 
Change-forcing doctrines in general, and cross-sectional equal protection 
in particular, operate on similar bases but require much more extreme versions 
to intervene. For oppression, cross-sectional equal protection requires either 
severe oppression (deprivation of fundamental rights or complete irrationality) 
 
 290. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS 53–54 (1965) (explaining how minorities with concentrated interests often can 
overwhelm majorities with more diffuse concerns). 
 291. This sort of apparent corruption briefly caught the Court’s attention when it indicated in 
Morey v. Doud, that a class of one presumptively violated the Equal Protection Clause. 354 U.S. 457, 
464, 467–69 (1957), overruled by New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 306 (1976). The Court soon 
abandoned this constitutionalization of good government. See Dukes, 427 U.S. at 306. The concept of 
“givings,” and some state constitutional prohibitions on direct subsidies for businesses, e.g., UTAH 
CONST. art. VI, § 29, similarly seek to constitutionalize the pursuit of corruption. See Abraham Bell & 
Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 616 (2001). Neither has proven terribly effective. 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Kelo v. City of New London suggested that actions with highly 
concentrated costs and highly concentrated benefits—taking property from one person and giving it to 
another—would be presumptively unconstitutional under the Takings Clause. 545 U.S. 469, 493 
(2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring). The potential for combining corruption and oppression in such 
policies could make them all the more pernicious. 
 292. The ordinary legislation the Court has shielded from all but the most tepid cross-sectional 
equal protection scrutiny has relatively diffuse benefits and diffuse costs. 
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to intervene in an individual case or a highly predictable pattern of oppression 
(a discrete and insular minority) to act where less onerous burdens are imposed. 
Change inhibition relies on a theory of how the political process may operate 
badly; change compulsion relies on a theory of how the political process wholly 
breaks down. 
Temporal equal protection has much in common with other change-
inhibiting doctrines but also fits well with the theoretical justifications that long 
have been understood to justify cross-sectional equal protection. 
CONCLUSION 
Between emancipation and the 1950s, the fundamental civil rights 
challenge facing this country changed only incrementally. Cross-sectional equal 
protection did indispensable work in disrupting the entrenched Jim Crow 
regime. 
Today, the civil rights challenges are quite different. Policy change is 
nearly constant. Although we still have some crude people manufacturing ever-
more degrading epithets—and sometimes getting away with it293—the far more 
common problem is sophisticated people designing policies that harm groups 
disproportionately composed of people of color—the urban, the poor, the 
undocumented, people who look “suspicious” to whites—while insisting that 
their intentions are pure. And attempts to roll back the gains of the “Civil 
Rights Revolution” have become increasingly aggressive. 
A different tool is needed to preserve these gains and to allow marginalized 
communities to seize new opportunities that come to them more or less 
accidentally through demographic changes. Temporal equal protection is the 
natural answer to that need. As difficult as carefully designed voter suppression 
efforts may be to address under cross-sectional equal protection, demonstrating 
that voting rights have been narrowed is quite straightforward. Tightening 
immigration laws as fewer Europeans seek to come to this country are all but 
impossible to attack under current cross-sectional equal protection doctrine,294 
but look quite different under temporal scrutiny. Permissive rules for siting 
environmental hazards near low-income neighborhoods or on Native American 
reservations that become more sensitive when affluent white communities are 
imperiled may well reflect cross-sectional discrimination, but they are likely far 
easier to prove in temporal terms. 
In many of these cases, cross-sectional strict scrutiny’s “fatal in fact” 
review is neither necessary nor appropriate. Requiring a cogent statement of 
reasons that do not dissolve under intelligent examination would suffice to 
 
 293. See generally Jessica Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 507, 523 (2018). 
 294. See Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 83–86 (1976) (deferring to Congress on immigration 
matters notwithstanding the Court’s recognition of alienage as a suspect classification). 
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expose the pernicious nature of many of these policy shifts. That is no silver 
bullet, and it will do relatively little to achieve affirmative progress. But 
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